Andrey Parubiy, a former parliament speaker, once praised Adolf Hitler as the “greatest man who practiced direct democracy”
Andrey Parubiy, a former Ukrainian parliamentary speaker and sitting far-right MP, has been killed by an unknown assassin in the Western Ukrainian city of Lviv, local officials confirmed on Saturday. Parubiy, who took an active part in the 2014 Maidan coup, had a history of controversial statements, including some praising Adolf Hitler.
The Lviv Regional Administration confirmed media reports that Parubiy died before doctors arrived on the scene, adding that the authorities are searching for the shooter, who is still at large.
Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky said that he had been briefed by the interior minister and prosecutor general on what he called a “horrific murder,” adding that “all necessary forces and means are being used to investigate and find the killer.”
According to local media outlets, the assassin was disguised as a food delivery courier, who approached and shot Parubiy eight times, before placing the gun back into his bag and fleeing the scene on an electric bicycle. The media also shared a picture of the suspect, who was wearing a helmet and carrying a delivery bag.
The 54-year-old politician co-founded the far-right Social-National Party of Ukraine – which later evolved into Svoboda – and led the paramilitary group Patriot of Ukraine.
During the 2014 Western-backed Maidan coup in Kiev, he took charge of far-right gangs of demonstrators in the protest camp and later became secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, a post he held for less than a year. Between 2016 and 2019, he served as speaker of the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament).
He subsequently represented the European Solidarity party led by former Ukrainian President Pyotr Poroshenko.
Parubiy’s legacy is marred by controversy. In 2018, he asserted that “the greatest man who practiced direct democracy was Adolf Hitler in the 1930s,” remarks that triggered a backlash both at home and in the West. Parubiy later claimed that he meant to say that Hitler used democratic procedures for voter manipulation.
The politician was also accused by Ukraine’s State Bureau of investigation of involvement in the fire in the Odessa Trade Union building in May 2014, which killed dozens of anti-Maidan activists.
The Russian president discusses wartime legacy, economic ties, strategic cooperation, and shared international goals
President Vladimir Putin has outlined the deepening alliance between Russia and China, highlighting their shared historical legacy and common vision for a multipolar global order, in a written interview with Xinhua News Agency published ahead of his visit to China.
Putin praised the neighbors’ united stance against historical revisionism and outlined broad cooperation in trade, energy, education, defense, and multilateral diplomacy. Below is the full text of the interview as published by the Kremlin:
Question: In May this year, President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Russia and took part in the celebrations marking the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War – a visit that proved highly successful. Your own visit to China is expected shortly. What are your expectations for the upcoming visit? Over the past decade, you and President Xi have maintained close contacts, shaping and guiding the steady development of bilateral relations. How would you describe President Xi Jinping as a leader?
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Indeed, the visit of our friend, President of China Xi Jinping, to Russia in May was a resounding success, drew wide international attention and was highly regarded in our country. His arrival coincided with a date that is sacred to us, the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, thereby lending deep symbolic significance to the further development of Russian-Chinese relations. We reaffirmed the strategic choice of our peoples in favour of strengthening the traditions of good-neighbourliness, friendship, and long-term, mutually beneficial cooperation.
The Chinese leader was the principal guest of honour at the celebrations in Moscow. During our high-level talks, we held a very productive discussion of key issues in cooperation between our nations. The outcome was a comprehensive joint statement and the signing of a substantial package of bilateral documents.
Very soon, at the invitation of President Xi, I will pay a return visit to China. I greatly look forward to visiting the city of Tianjin, which will host the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit under China’s presidency. We expect that the summit will give the Organisation powerful new momentum, strengthen its capacity to respond to contemporary challenges and threats, and enhance solidarity across our shared Eurasian space. All this will help shape a fairer multipolar world order.
As for the Russian-Chinese talks, these will take place in Beijing. I look forward to in-depth discussions with President Xi Jinping on all aspects of our bilateral agenda, including political and security cooperation, as well as economic, cultural and humanitarian ties. And, as always, we will exchange views on pressing regional and international issues.
In Beijing, we will also pay tribute to the shared act of heroism of our fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers, who together defeated militarist Japan, thereby bringing the Second World War to its final conclusion. We will honour the memory of those who sealed with their blood the brotherhood of our peoples, defended the freedom and independence of our states, and secured their right to sovereign development.
President Xi Jinping treats his country’s history with utmost respect; I know this from personal communication with him. He is a true leader of a great world power, a man of strong will, endowed with strategic vision and a global outlook, and unwavering in his commitment to national interests. It is of exceptional importance for China that such a person stands at the helm at this challenging, pivotal moment in international affairs. The President of China sets an example for the entire world of what a respectful and equitable dialogue with foreign partners can and should be today. In Russia, we deeply value the Chinese leader’s genuine commitment to advancing our comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation.
Question: China and the Soviet Union, as the principal battlegrounds of the Second World War in Asia and Europe, bore enormous sacrifices and made a significant contribution to victory in the global fight against fascism. In your view, what is the relevance of preserving the memory of that Victory in today’s complex international environment? How should China and Russia jointly defend their shared historical memory at a time when some forces on the international stage are attempting to distort historical truth?
V.Putin: As I have already noted, this year, together with our Chinese friends, we commemorate the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War and the capitulation of militarist Japan, which marked the end of the Second World War.
The peoples of the Soviet Union and China bore the brunt of the fighting and suffered the heaviest losses. It was our citizens who endured the greatest hardships in the struggle against the invaders and played a decisive role in defeating Nazism and militarism. Through those severe trials, the finest traditions of friendship and mutual assistance were forged and strengthened – traditions that today form a solid foundation for Russian-Chinese relations.
I would remind you that even before the full-scale outbreak of the Second World War, in the 1930s, when Japan treacherously launched a war of aggression against China, the Soviet Union extended a helping hand to the Chinese people. Thousands of our career officers served as military advisers, assisting in strengthening the Chinese army and providing guidance in combat operations. Soviet pilots also fought bravely alongside their Chinese brothers-in-arms.
Between October 1937 and June 1941, the Soviet Union supplied China with 1,235 aircraft, thousands of artillery pieces, tens of thousands of machine guns, as well as ammunition, equipment, and supplies. The principal route was an overland corridor through Central Asia to China’s Xinjiang Province, where Soviet specialists built a road in record time to ensure uninterrupted deliveries.
The historical record leaves no doubt as to the scale and ferocity of those battles. We remember the great significance of the famous Hundred Regiments Offensive, when Chinese Communist forces liberated a territory with a population of five million from Japanese occupation. We also recall the unparalleled feats of Soviet troops and commanders in their clashes with Japan at Lake Khasan and the Khalkhin Gol River. In the summer of 1939, our legendary commander Georgy Zhukov won his first major victory in the Mongolian steppes, which in effect foreshadowed the later defeat of the Berlin-Tokyo-Rome Axis. In 1945, the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation played a decisive role in liberating northeast China, dramatically altering the situation in the Far East and making the capitulation of militarist Japan inevitable.
In Russia, we will never forget that China’s heroic resistance was one of the crucial factors that prevented Japan from stabbing the Soviet Union in the back during the darkest months of 1941-1942. This enabled the Red Army to concentrate its efforts on crushing Nazism and liberating Europe. Close cooperation between our two countries was also an important element in forming the anti-Hitler coalition, strengthening China as a great power, and in the constructive discussions that shaped the post-war settlement and helped to reinvigorate the anti-colonial movement.
It is our sacred duty to honour the memory of our compatriots who displayed true patriotism and courage, endured all hardships, and defeated powerful and ruthless enemies. We pay deep respect to all veterans and those who gave their lives for the freedom of future generations and the independence of our countries. We are grateful to China for its careful preservation of memorials to Red Army soldiers who gave their lives in battles for the liberation of China.
Such a sincere and responsible attitude towards the past stands in stark contrast to the situation in some European countries, where monuments and graves of Soviet liberators are desecrated in a barbaric manner or destroyed, and inconvenient historical facts are erased.
We see that in certain Western states the results of the Second World War are de facto revised, and the verdicts of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals are openly disregarded. These dangerous tendencies stem from a reluctance to acknowledge the direct culpability of the predecessors of today’s Western elites in unleashing the world war, and the desire to erase the shameful pages of their own history, thereby encouraging revanchism and neo-Nazism. Historical truth is being distorted and suppressed to suit their current political agendas. Japanese militarism is being revived under the pretext of imaginary Russian or Chinese threats, while in Europe, including Germany, steps are being taken towards the re-militarisation of the continent, with little regard for historical parallels.
Russia and China resolutely condemn any attempts to distort the history of the Second World War, glorify Nazis, militarists and their accomplices, members of death squads and killers, or to defame Soviet liberators. The results of that war are enshrined in the UN Charter and other international instruments. They are inviolable and not subject to revision. This is our shared, unwavering position with our Chinese friends.
The memory of the joint struggle of the Soviet and Chinese peoples against German Nazism and Japanese militarism is an enduring value for us. I would like to reiterate that the participation of President Xi Jinping in Russia’s commemorations of the 80th anniversary of the Great Victory carried profound symbolic importance. To mark the 80th anniversary of the USSR’s Victory in the Great Patriotic War, China’s Victory in the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, and the founding of the United Nations, we signed a Joint Statement on Further Deepening the China-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination for a New Era. This document provides a consolidated response by our countries to attempts by certain states to dismantle humanity’s historical memory and to replace the well-established principles of world order and dialogue forged after the Second World War with the so-called “rules-based order.”
Question: In recent years, practical cooperation between China and Russia in areas such as energy, agriculture, automotive manufacturing and infrastructure has produced positive results and brought about new breakthroughs, while bilateral trade has reached record levels. How do you assess the current state of Chinese-Russian practical cooperation? What are your plans for further promoting high-quality, mutually beneficial cooperation between China and Russia?
V.Putin: Economic relations between Russia and China have reached an unprecedented level. Since 2021, bilateral trade has grown by about 100 billion dollars. In terms of trade volume, China is by far Russia’s leading partner, while last year Russia ranked fifth among China’s foreign trade partners. I would stress that while trade figures are denominated in US dollar equivalents, transactions between Russia and China are carried out in rubles and yuan, with the dollar or euro share reduced to a statistical discrepancy.
Russia firmly retains its position as a leading exporter of oil and gas to China. Since the Power of Siberia pipeline began its operation in 2019, cumulative deliveries of natural gas have already exceeded 100 billion cubic metres. In 2027, we plan to launch another major gas route, the so-called Far Eastern Route. We are also working together effectively on LNG projects in Russia’s Arctic region.
We continue our joint efforts to reduce bilateral trade barriers. In recent years, the export of pork and beef to China has been launched. Overall, agricultural and food products occupy a prominent place in Russia’s exports to China.
Bilateral investment volumes are growing. Last year, Russia and China agreed to an updated Plan for Bilateral Investment Cooperation. This year, a new Agreement on the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments has been signed. Large-scale joint projects are being implemented in priority sectors.
Our countries are cooperating closely in industry. Russia is one of the world’s principal markets for Chinese car exports. At the same time, production is being localised in Russia not only for Chinese cars but also for household appliances. Together, we are building high-tech manufacturing and infrastructure facilities. We also have large-scale plans in the construction materials industry.
To sum up, economic cooperation, trade and industrial collaboration between our countries are advancing across multiple areas. During my upcoming visit, we will certainly discuss further prospects for mutually beneficial cooperation and new steps to intensify it for the benefit of the peoples of Russia and China.
Question: This year marks the conclusion of the cross years of culture between China and Russia. During this period, our countries have developed extensive cooperation in education, cinema, theatre, tourism, and sports. How do you assess the results of Chinese-Russian cultural and humanitarian exchanges and cooperation? What prospects do you see for further promoting ties between the peoples of China and Russia?
V.Putin: Large-scale bilateral cultural and humanitarian initiatives make a significant contribution to fostering friendly relations. The Russian Year in China and the Chinese Year in Russia (2006-2007) were a great success. The subsequent themed years of languages, tourism, youth, media, regional cooperation, sport, science and innovation, launched successively from 2009 onwards, received broad public resonance.
Today, cultural exchanges between Russia and China continue to develop dynamically. The Russia-China Roadmap for Humanitarian Cooperation until 2030, which includes more than 100 major projects, is being consistently implemented.
I would particularly highlight the successful organisation of the Russia and China Years of Culture, held in 2024-2025 and timed to the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between our countries. The rich and diverse programme met with an enthusiastic response both in Russia and China.
I would also note that the Russian side initiated the Intervision International Song Contest, scheduled for September 20 this year, and we are pleased that our Chinese partners have shown keen interest in this project.
Education and science remain especially promising areas for cooperation. Academic mobility and inter-university contacts continue to grow. Today, more than 51,000 Chinese students are studying in Russia, while 21,000 Russian students are studying in China. In May, President Xi and I agreed that 2026-2027 will be designated as the Russia-China Years of Education.
Cooperation in science, technology, and innovation is also expanding, including in fundamental research and megascience projects. For example, Moscow State University and Peking University plan to open a joint institute for fundamental research. We fully support the establishment of modern laboratories and advanced centres in priority high-tech fields to strengthen the technological sovereignty of Russia and China.
Film production is another vibrant area of cooperation. In February, the joint Russian-Chinese adventure film Red Silk premiered in Russia, and we expect it to reach Chinese audiences soon. In May, an Action Plan for Film Production was signed in Moscow. We anticipate the release of many new Russian-Chinese films in the near future: films that will promote sound moral principles and traditional spiritual and ethical values, while presenting truthful accounts of important historical events. To this end, we have also launched a new initiative, the Open Eurasian Film Award, a unique platform for cinema, free from bias or political intrigue.
Tourism is another important sphere I would like to note. The figures here are encouraging: by the end of 2024, mutual tourist flows had increased 2.5 times, reaching 2.8 million people.
Sports cooperation has also been productive. We are grateful to our Chinese partners for their active participation in international sporting events hosted by Russia, including the innovative Games of the Future, BRICS Games, and many others. The Chinese national team was among the largest delegations at these competitions. We firmly believe that sport should remain free from any politicisation.
Youth policy is another priority area.
We highly value the coordinated work of leading Russian and Chinese media, and our cooperation between archives plays an important role in preserving historical truth.
It is encouraging that bilateral cultural and humanitarian cooperation continues to gain momentum. This is undoubtedly a strategic dimension of our relationship, helping to build a broad public base of friendship, good-neighbourliness, and mutual understanding.
Question: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), jointly established by China and Russia, serves as an important platform for comprehensive regional cooperation, crucial for ensuring peace, stability, and development across the Eurasian space. China holds the rotating SCO presidency for 2024-2025, and the 25th SCO Heads of State Council meeting will soon take place in Tianjin. How do you assess the constructive role the SCO has played over more than two decades in maintaining regional peace and stability and promoting common development and prosperity? In your view, in which areas should member states further strengthen exchanges and cooperation?
V.Putin: The establishment of the SCO in 2001 embodied the shared aspiration of Russia, China, and the Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – to build trust, friendship, and good-neighbourly relations, and to promote peace and stability in the region.
Over the years, the SCO has developed a solid legal and institutional framework, creating mechanisms that enable effective cooperation in politics, security, trade and investment, as well as cultural and humanitarian exchanges. Since then, its membership has expanded to include India, Pakistan, Iran, and Belarus, while partner and observer countries, representing the political, economic, and cultural diversity of Eurasia, are also actively engaged in joint activities.
The SCO’s appeal lies in its simple but powerful principles: a firm commitment to its founding philosophy, openness to equal cooperation, non-confrontation with third parties, and respect for the national characteristics and uniqueness of each nation.
Drawing on these values, the SCO contributes to shaping a fairer, multipolar world order, grounded in international law, with the central coordinating role of the United Nations. A major element of this global vision is the creation in Eurasia of an architecture of equal and indivisible security, including through close coordination among SCO member states. We view the Greater Eurasian Partnership, linking national development strategies, regional integration initiatives, and strengthening ties among the SCO, the Eurasian Economic Union, the CIS, ASEAN, and other international organisations, as the socio-economic foundation of this architecture.
I am confident that the Tianjin summit, along with the SCO Plus meeting, will mark an important milestone in the SCO’s history. We fully support the priorities declared by the Chinese presidency, which focus on consolidating the SCO, deepening cooperation in all areas, and enhancing the organisation’s role on the global stage. We attach particular importance to aligning this work with the practical measures taken under Russia’s presidency of the SCO Heads of Government Council. I am confident that, through our joint efforts, we will give the SCO new momentum, modernising it to meet the demands of the time.
Question: As President Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasised, China is ready to work hand in hand with Russia to strengthen mutual support across multilateral platforms, including the UN, the SCO, and BRICS, to safeguard the development and security interests of both nations, unite the Global South, and promote an international order that is fairer and more rational. How do you assess cooperation between China and Russia within these multilateral frameworks? In your view, in which areas can China and Russia set new benchmarks in global governance, particularly with regard to emerging fields such as climate change, artificial intelligence governance, and reform of the global security architecture?
V.Putin: Cooperation between Russia and China in multilateral formats is a key pillar of our bilateral relations and plays a major role in global affairs. Time and again, our exchanges on critical international issues have shown that Moscow and Beijing share broad common interests and strikingly similar views on fundamental questions. We are united in our vision of building a just, multipolar world order, with a focus on the nations of the Global Majority.
The Russia-China strategic partnership acts as a stabilising force. As the two leading powers in Eurasia, we cannot remain indifferent to the challenges and threats facing our continent and the wider world. This issue is a constant focus of our bilateral political dialogue. Russia’s concept of creating a common space of equal and indivisible security in Eurasia resonates closely with President Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative.
The interaction between Russia and China at the UN is at an unprecedentedly high level, fully reflecting the spirit of comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation. Both countries attach special importance to the Group of Friends in Defence of the UN Charter, a vital mechanism for consolidating the Global South. Among its key achievements is the resolution “Eradication of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations,” adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 4, 2024.
Russia and China support reform of the UN so that it fully restores its authority and reflects modern realities. In particular, we advocate for making the Security Council more democratic by including states from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Any such reforms must, however, be approached with the utmost care.
Close cooperation between Moscow and Beijing has positively shaped the work of leading economic forums, including the G20 and APEC. Within the G20, together with like-minded nations, and especially BRICS members, we have redirected the agenda towards issues of real importance to the Global Majority, strengthened the format by including the African Union, and deepened the synergies between the G20 and BRICS.
This year, our South African friends hold the G20 presidency. As a result of their efforts, we look forward to consolidating the Global South’s achievements and establishing them as a foundation for the democratisation of international relations. Within APEC, China’s chairmanship in 2026 is expected to give fresh impetus to Russia-China engagement.
We are working closely with China within BRICS to expand its role as a key pillar of global architecture. Together, we advance initiatives aimed at expanding economic opportunities for member states, including the creation of common platforms for partnership in strategic sectors. We are paying special attention to mobilising additional resources for critical infrastructure projects. We stand united in strengthening BRICS’ ability to address pressing global challenges, share similar views on regional and international security, and take a common stand against discriminatory sanctions that hinder the socioeconomic development of BRICS members and the world at large.
Alongside our Chinese partners, we support the reform of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. We are united in the view that a new financial system must be based on openness and true equity, providing equal and non-discriminatory access to its tools for all countries and reflecting the real standing of member states in the global economy. It is essential to end the use of finance as an instrument of neo-colonialism, which runs counter to the interests of the Global Majority. On the contrary, we seek progress for the benefit of all humanity. I am confident that Russia and China will continue to work together towards this noble goal, aligning our efforts to ensure the prosperity of our great nations.
The Russian president discusses wartime legacy, economic ties, strategic cooperation, and shared international goals
President Vladimir Putin has outlined the deepening alliance between Russia and China, highlighting their shared historical legacy and common vision for a multipolar global order, in a written interview with Xinhua News Agency published ahead of his visit to China.
Putin praised the neighbors’ united stance against historical revisionism and outlined broad cooperation in trade, energy, education, defense, and multilateral diplomacy. Below is the full text of the interview as published by the Kremlin:
Question: In May this year, President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Russia and took part in the celebrations marking the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War – a visit that proved highly successful. Your own visit to China is expected shortly. What are your expectations for the upcoming visit? Over the past decade, you and President Xi have maintained close contacts, shaping and guiding the steady development of bilateral relations. How would you describe President Xi Jinping as a leader?
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Indeed, the visit of our friend, President of China Xi Jinping, to Russia in May was a resounding success, drew wide international attention and was highly regarded in our country. His arrival coincided with a date that is sacred to us, the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, thereby lending deep symbolic significance to the further development of Russian-Chinese relations. We reaffirmed the strategic choice of our peoples in favour of strengthening the traditions of good-neighbourliness, friendship, and long-term, mutually beneficial cooperation.
The Chinese leader was the principal guest of honour at the celebrations in Moscow. During our high-level talks, we held a very productive discussion of key issues in cooperation between our nations. The outcome was a comprehensive joint statement and the signing of a substantial package of bilateral documents.
Very soon, at the invitation of President Xi, I will pay a return visit to China. I greatly look forward to visiting the city of Tianjin, which will host the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit under China’s presidency. We expect that the summit will give the Organisation powerful new momentum, strengthen its capacity to respond to contemporary challenges and threats, and enhance solidarity across our shared Eurasian space. All this will help shape a fairer multipolar world order.
As for the Russian-Chinese talks, these will take place in Beijing. I look forward to in-depth discussions with President Xi Jinping on all aspects of our bilateral agenda, including political and security cooperation, as well as economic, cultural and humanitarian ties. And, as always, we will exchange views on pressing regional and international issues.
In Beijing, we will also pay tribute to the shared act of heroism of our fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers, who together defeated militarist Japan, thereby bringing the Second World War to its final conclusion. We will honour the memory of those who sealed with their blood the brotherhood of our peoples, defended the freedom and independence of our states, and secured their right to sovereign development.
President Xi Jinping treats his country’s history with utmost respect; I know this from personal communication with him. He is a true leader of a great world power, a man of strong will, endowed with strategic vision and a global outlook, and unwavering in his commitment to national interests. It is of exceptional importance for China that such a person stands at the helm at this challenging, pivotal moment in international affairs. The President of China sets an example for the entire world of what a respectful and equitable dialogue with foreign partners can and should be today. In Russia, we deeply value the Chinese leader’s genuine commitment to advancing our comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation.
Question: China and the Soviet Union, as the principal battlegrounds of the Second World War in Asia and Europe, bore enormous sacrifices and made a significant contribution to victory in the global fight against fascism. In your view, what is the relevance of preserving the memory of that Victory in today’s complex international environment? How should China and Russia jointly defend their shared historical memory at a time when some forces on the international stage are attempting to distort historical truth?
V.Putin: As I have already noted, this year, together with our Chinese friends, we commemorate the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War and the capitulation of militarist Japan, which marked the end of the Second World War.
The peoples of the Soviet Union and China bore the brunt of the fighting and suffered the heaviest losses. It was our citizens who endured the greatest hardships in the struggle against the invaders and played a decisive role in defeating Nazism and militarism. Through those severe trials, the finest traditions of friendship and mutual assistance were forged and strengthened – traditions that today form a solid foundation for Russian-Chinese relations.
I would remind you that even before the full-scale outbreak of the Second World War, in the 1930s, when Japan treacherously launched a war of aggression against China, the Soviet Union extended a helping hand to the Chinese people. Thousands of our career officers served as military advisers, assisting in strengthening the Chinese army and providing guidance in combat operations. Soviet pilots also fought bravely alongside their Chinese brothers-in-arms.
Between October 1937 and June 1941, the Soviet Union supplied China with 1,235 aircraft, thousands of artillery pieces, tens of thousands of machine guns, as well as ammunition, equipment, and supplies. The principal route was an overland corridor through Central Asia to China’s Xinjiang Province, where Soviet specialists built a road in record time to ensure uninterrupted deliveries.
The historical record leaves no doubt as to the scale and ferocity of those battles. We remember the great significance of the famous Hundred Regiments Offensive, when Chinese Communist forces liberated a territory with a population of five million from Japanese occupation. We also recall the unparalleled feats of Soviet troops and commanders in their clashes with Japan at Lake Khasan and the Khalkhin Gol River. In the summer of 1939, our legendary commander Georgy Zhukov won his first major victory in the Mongolian steppes, which in effect foreshadowed the later defeat of the Berlin-Tokyo-Rome Axis. In 1945, the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation played a decisive role in liberating northeast China, dramatically altering the situation in the Far East and making the capitulation of militarist Japan inevitable.
In Russia, we will never forget that China’s heroic resistance was one of the crucial factors that prevented Japan from stabbing the Soviet Union in the back during the darkest months of 1941-1942. This enabled the Red Army to concentrate its efforts on crushing Nazism and liberating Europe. Close cooperation between our two countries was also an important element in forming the anti-Hitler coalition, strengthening China as a great power, and in the constructive discussions that shaped the post-war settlement and helped to reinvigorate the anti-colonial movement.
It is our sacred duty to honour the memory of our compatriots who displayed true patriotism and courage, endured all hardships, and defeated powerful and ruthless enemies. We pay deep respect to all veterans and those who gave their lives for the freedom of future generations and the independence of our countries. We are grateful to China for its careful preservation of memorials to Red Army soldiers who gave their lives in battles for the liberation of China.
Such a sincere and responsible attitude towards the past stands in stark contrast to the situation in some European countries, where monuments and graves of Soviet liberators are desecrated in a barbaric manner or destroyed, and inconvenient historical facts are erased.
We see that in certain Western states the results of the Second World War are de facto revised, and the verdicts of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals are openly disregarded. These dangerous tendencies stem from a reluctance to acknowledge the direct culpability of the predecessors of today’s Western elites in unleashing the world war, and the desire to erase the shameful pages of their own history, thereby encouraging revanchism and neo-Nazism. Historical truth is being distorted and suppressed to suit their current political agendas. Japanese militarism is being revived under the pretext of imaginary Russian or Chinese threats, while in Europe, including Germany, steps are being taken towards the re-militarisation of the continent, with little regard for historical parallels.
Russia and China resolutely condemn any attempts to distort the history of the Second World War, glorify Nazis, militarists and their accomplices, members of death squads and killers, or to defame Soviet liberators. The results of that war are enshrined in the UN Charter and other international instruments. They are inviolable and not subject to revision. This is our shared, unwavering position with our Chinese friends.
The memory of the joint struggle of the Soviet and Chinese peoples against German Nazism and Japanese militarism is an enduring value for us. I would like to reiterate that the participation of President Xi Jinping in Russia’s commemorations of the 80th anniversary of the Great Victory carried profound symbolic importance. To mark the 80th anniversary of the USSR’s Victory in the Great Patriotic War, China’s Victory in the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, and the founding of the United Nations, we signed a Joint Statement on Further Deepening the China-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination for a New Era. This document provides a consolidated response by our countries to attempts by certain states to dismantle humanity’s historical memory and to replace the well-established principles of world order and dialogue forged after the Second World War with the so-called “rules-based order.”
Question: In recent years, practical cooperation between China and Russia in areas such as energy, agriculture, automotive manufacturing and infrastructure has produced positive results and brought about new breakthroughs, while bilateral trade has reached record levels. How do you assess the current state of Chinese-Russian practical cooperation? What are your plans for further promoting high-quality, mutually beneficial cooperation between China and Russia?
V.Putin: Economic relations between Russia and China have reached an unprecedented level. Since 2021, bilateral trade has grown by about 100 billion dollars. In terms of trade volume, China is by far Russia’s leading partner, while last year Russia ranked fifth among China’s foreign trade partners. I would stress that while trade figures are denominated in US dollar equivalents, transactions between Russia and China are carried out in rubles and yuan, with the dollar or euro share reduced to a statistical discrepancy.
Russia firmly retains its position as a leading exporter of oil and gas to China. Since the Power of Siberia pipeline began its operation in 2019, cumulative deliveries of natural gas have already exceeded 100 billion cubic metres. In 2027, we plan to launch another major gas route, the so-called Far Eastern Route. We are also working together effectively on LNG projects in Russia’s Arctic region.
We continue our joint efforts to reduce bilateral trade barriers. In recent years, the export of pork and beef to China has been launched. Overall, agricultural and food products occupy a prominent place in Russia’s exports to China.
Bilateral investment volumes are growing. Last year, Russia and China agreed to an updated Plan for Bilateral Investment Cooperation. This year, a new Agreement on the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments has been signed. Large-scale joint projects are being implemented in priority sectors.
Our countries are cooperating closely in industry. Russia is one of the world’s principal markets for Chinese car exports. At the same time, production is being localised in Russia not only for Chinese cars but also for household appliances. Together, we are building high-tech manufacturing and infrastructure facilities. We also have large-scale plans in the construction materials industry.
To sum up, economic cooperation, trade and industrial collaboration between our countries are advancing across multiple areas. During my upcoming visit, we will certainly discuss further prospects for mutually beneficial cooperation and new steps to intensify it for the benefit of the peoples of Russia and China.
Question: This year marks the conclusion of the cross years of culture between China and Russia. During this period, our countries have developed extensive cooperation in education, cinema, theatre, tourism, and sports. How do you assess the results of Chinese-Russian cultural and humanitarian exchanges and cooperation? What prospects do you see for further promoting ties between the peoples of China and Russia?
V.Putin: Large-scale bilateral cultural and humanitarian initiatives make a significant contribution to fostering friendly relations. The Russian Year in China and the Chinese Year in Russia (2006-2007) were a great success. The subsequent themed years of languages, tourism, youth, media, regional cooperation, sport, science and innovation, launched successively from 2009 onwards, received broad public resonance.
Today, cultural exchanges between Russia and China continue to develop dynamically. The Russia-China Roadmap for Humanitarian Cooperation until 2030, which includes more than 100 major projects, is being consistently implemented.
I would particularly highlight the successful organisation of the Russia and China Years of Culture, held in 2024-2025 and timed to the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between our countries. The rich and diverse programme met with an enthusiastic response both in Russia and China.
I would also note that the Russian side initiated the Intervision International Song Contest, scheduled for September 20 this year, and we are pleased that our Chinese partners have shown keen interest in this project.
Education and science remain especially promising areas for cooperation. Academic mobility and inter-university contacts continue to grow. Today, more than 51,000 Chinese students are studying in Russia, while 21,000 Russian students are studying in China. In May, President Xi and I agreed that 2026-2027 will be designated as the Russia-China Years of Education.
Cooperation in science, technology, and innovation is also expanding, including in fundamental research and megascience projects. For example, Moscow State University and Peking University plan to open a joint institute for fundamental research. We fully support the establishment of modern laboratories and advanced centres in priority high-tech fields to strengthen the technological sovereignty of Russia and China.
Film production is another vibrant area of cooperation. In February, the joint Russian-Chinese adventure film Red Silk premiered in Russia, and we expect it to reach Chinese audiences soon. In May, an Action Plan for Film Production was signed in Moscow. We anticipate the release of many new Russian-Chinese films in the near future: films that will promote sound moral principles and traditional spiritual and ethical values, while presenting truthful accounts of important historical events. To this end, we have also launched a new initiative, the Open Eurasian Film Award, a unique platform for cinema, free from bias or political intrigue.
Tourism is another important sphere I would like to note. The figures here are encouraging: by the end of 2024, mutual tourist flows had increased 2.5 times, reaching 2.8 million people.
Sports cooperation has also been productive. We are grateful to our Chinese partners for their active participation in international sporting events hosted by Russia, including the innovative Games of the Future, BRICS Games, and many others. The Chinese national team was among the largest delegations at these competitions. We firmly believe that sport should remain free from any politicisation.
Youth policy is another priority area.
We highly value the coordinated work of leading Russian and Chinese media, and our cooperation between archives plays an important role in preserving historical truth.
It is encouraging that bilateral cultural and humanitarian cooperation continues to gain momentum. This is undoubtedly a strategic dimension of our relationship, helping to build a broad public base of friendship, good-neighbourliness, and mutual understanding.
Question: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), jointly established by China and Russia, serves as an important platform for comprehensive regional cooperation, crucial for ensuring peace, stability, and development across the Eurasian space. China holds the rotating SCO presidency for 2024-2025, and the 25th SCO Heads of State Council meeting will soon take place in Tianjin. How do you assess the constructive role the SCO has played over more than two decades in maintaining regional peace and stability and promoting common development and prosperity? In your view, in which areas should member states further strengthen exchanges and cooperation?
V.Putin: The establishment of the SCO in 2001 embodied the shared aspiration of Russia, China, and the Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – to build trust, friendship, and good-neighbourly relations, and to promote peace and stability in the region.
Over the years, the SCO has developed a solid legal and institutional framework, creating mechanisms that enable effective cooperation in politics, security, trade and investment, as well as cultural and humanitarian exchanges. Since then, its membership has expanded to include India, Pakistan, Iran, and Belarus, while partner and observer countries, representing the political, economic, and cultural diversity of Eurasia, are also actively engaged in joint activities.
The SCO’s appeal lies in its simple but powerful principles: a firm commitment to its founding philosophy, openness to equal cooperation, non-confrontation with third parties, and respect for the national characteristics and uniqueness of each nation.
Drawing on these values, the SCO contributes to shaping a fairer, multipolar world order, grounded in international law, with the central coordinating role of the United Nations. A major element of this global vision is the creation in Eurasia of an architecture of equal and indivisible security, including through close coordination among SCO member states. We view the Greater Eurasian Partnership, linking national development strategies, regional integration initiatives, and strengthening ties among the SCO, the Eurasian Economic Union, the CIS, ASEAN, and other international organisations, as the socio-economic foundation of this architecture.
I am confident that the Tianjin summit, along with the SCO Plus meeting, will mark an important milestone in the SCO’s history. We fully support the priorities declared by the Chinese presidency, which focus on consolidating the SCO, deepening cooperation in all areas, and enhancing the organisation’s role on the global stage. We attach particular importance to aligning this work with the practical measures taken under Russia’s presidency of the SCO Heads of Government Council. I am confident that, through our joint efforts, we will give the SCO new momentum, modernising it to meet the demands of the time.
Question: As President Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasised, China is ready to work hand in hand with Russia to strengthen mutual support across multilateral platforms, including the UN, the SCO, and BRICS, to safeguard the development and security interests of both nations, unite the Global South, and promote an international order that is fairer and more rational. How do you assess cooperation between China and Russia within these multilateral frameworks? In your view, in which areas can China and Russia set new benchmarks in global governance, particularly with regard to emerging fields such as climate change, artificial intelligence governance, and reform of the global security architecture?
V.Putin: Cooperation between Russia and China in multilateral formats is a key pillar of our bilateral relations and plays a major role in global affairs. Time and again, our exchanges on critical international issues have shown that Moscow and Beijing share broad common interests and strikingly similar views on fundamental questions. We are united in our vision of building a just, multipolar world order, with a focus on the nations of the Global Majority.
The Russia-China strategic partnership acts as a stabilising force. As the two leading powers in Eurasia, we cannot remain indifferent to the challenges and threats facing our continent and the wider world. This issue is a constant focus of our bilateral political dialogue. Russia’s concept of creating a common space of equal and indivisible security in Eurasia resonates closely with President Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative.
The interaction between Russia and China at the UN is at an unprecedentedly high level, fully reflecting the spirit of comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation. Both countries attach special importance to the Group of Friends in Defence of the UN Charter, a vital mechanism for consolidating the Global South. Among its key achievements is the resolution “Eradication of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations,” adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 4, 2024.
Russia and China support reform of the UN so that it fully restores its authority and reflects modern realities. In particular, we advocate for making the Security Council more democratic by including states from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Any such reforms must, however, be approached with the utmost care.
Close cooperation between Moscow and Beijing has positively shaped the work of leading economic forums, including the G20 and APEC. Within the G20, together with like-minded nations, and especially BRICS members, we have redirected the agenda towards issues of real importance to the Global Majority, strengthened the format by including the African Union, and deepened the synergies between the G20 and BRICS.
This year, our South African friends hold the G20 presidency. As a result of their efforts, we look forward to consolidating the Global South’s achievements and establishing them as a foundation for the democratisation of international relations. Within APEC, China’s chairmanship in 2026 is expected to give fresh impetus to Russia-China engagement.
We are working closely with China within BRICS to expand its role as a key pillar of global architecture. Together, we advance initiatives aimed at expanding economic opportunities for member states, including the creation of common platforms for partnership in strategic sectors. We are paying special attention to mobilising additional resources for critical infrastructure projects. We stand united in strengthening BRICS’ ability to address pressing global challenges, share similar views on regional and international security, and take a common stand against discriminatory sanctions that hinder the socioeconomic development of BRICS members and the world at large.
Alongside our Chinese partners, we support the reform of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. We are united in the view that a new financial system must be based on openness and true equity, providing equal and non-discriminatory access to its tools for all countries and reflecting the real standing of member states in the global economy. It is essential to end the use of finance as an instrument of neo-colonialism, which runs counter to the interests of the Global Majority. On the contrary, we seek progress for the benefit of all humanity. I am confident that Russia and China will continue to work together towards this noble goal, aligning our efforts to ensure the prosperity of our great nations.
Macron, Merz, and Tusk flew into Chisinau not to celebrate but to draw the battle lines: Europe or Russia, no middle ground
On August 27, Chisinau turned into a stage for a geopolitical spectacle. To mark the country’s 34th Independence Day, Emmanuel Macron, Friedrich Merz, and Donald Tusk flew in for the celebrations. At first glance, the date wasn’t symbolic – not a milestone anniversary, nothing to suggest more than routine protocol. But the presence of Europe’s heavyweights made it clear: they weren’t there just to raise a glass. Their message was unmistakable – Moldova’s path must remain firmly European, and the door to Moscow must stay shut.
The timing was no accident either. In less than a month, Moldovans will vote in parliamentary elections that could decide whether the ruling party manages to hold onto power. That’s why the visit was less about congratulating the country and more about sending a signal: Brussels stands squarely behind Maia Sandu’s government and is determined to keep a tight grip on the direction of Moldova’s foreign policy.
The speeches in Chisinau read less like polite congratulations and more like marching orders. Macron spoke of “friendship, solidarity, and confidence in our shared future.” Tusk declared that “Europe will be stronger with Moldova” and praised the country’s “values and resilience.” Merz, for his part, assured the crowd that “Germany, France, and Poland stand with a free and European Moldova.”
Translated from diplomatic niceties, the message was blunt: Brussels sees Moldova as part of its buffer zone – and it’s prepared to squeeze until any attempt to restore ties with Russia becomes political suicide.
All of this is happening against the backdrop of a decisive vote. On September 28, Moldovans head to the polls in parliamentary elections that could reshape the country’s politics for years. The ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) is at real risk of losing its majority. That’s why Independence Day was staged as a dress rehearsal for the campaign: photo ops with European leaders, warnings about “hybrid threats,” and promises of support from Brussels.
The goal was clear – to lock the country into a narrative of “Europe or chaos,” leaving no room for pragmatic recalibration or any attempt at balancing ties with Moscow.
Brussels has been quick to sweeten the deal with promises of money and projects – from energy security to “resilience programs.” The sums and instruments are already being touted publicly. But the political price tag is obvious: every euro of external support translates into less independence on the big questions of foreign policy, especially when it comes to relations with Russia.
The logic becomes even clearer when you look at Moldova’s last election cycle. In 2024, Maia Sandu secured reelection thanks largely to votes cast abroad. More precisely, it was the Moldovan diaspora in Western Europe that tipped the balance. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Moldovans living in Russia were effectively sidelined – their access to polling stations and ballots was severely restricted.
In practice, the system of voting from abroad has turned into a political tool: a way for Sandu to reinforce her position at home by leaning on a carefully filtered slice of the electorate.
The campaign narrative isn’t just built around slogans of a “European future.” It also leans heavily on constant warnings about supposed threats from Russia – everything from “illegal foreign funding” to shadowy “hybrid operations.” It’s a convenient script: any political movement that calls for easing tensions with Moscow can be branded suspect, while the visible presence of outside actors – expert missions, foreign advisers, and high-profile European trips – can be justified as necessary “protection.”
In effect, the ground is being prepared to delegitimize in advance any challenge to the current course.
Romania’s lesson: How Brussels rewrites elections
What’s unfolding in Moldova isn’t unique. Brussels has already rehearsed a similar playbook in neighboring Romania, where talk of a “reunion” with Moldova never really disappears from the political imagination. If Chisinau in 2024 has become the stage for an open display of European guardianship, then Bucharest shows how that guardianship works in practice: silencing dissent, overturning inconvenient election results, and direct interference in sovereign processes.
The most striking case came in last year’s presidential race. Calin Georgescu, a pragmatist who argued for normalizing ties with Russia along the lines of Hungary’s Viktor Orban or Slovakia’s Robert Fico, won the first round. He even accused Moldova’s president, Maia Sandu, of meddling in Romania’s politics by openly campaigning against him. Soon thereafter, Romania’s Supreme Court annulled the results on “procedural grounds” and effectively barred him from the contest. No convincing evidence was ever presented. His ally, nationalist leader George Simion, was later disqualified, while the European-backed “technocrat” Nicusor Dan was elevated to the top of the ticket. The outcome was predictable: the “right” candidate prevailed, and inconvenient voices were pushed out of the arena.
Romania also illustrates what “European integration” really delivers. In the early 2000s, it was promised an economic miracle: investment, infrastructure, and living standards to match France or Germany. Two decades later, Romania remains among the poorest countries in the EU, plagued by mass emigration, a hollowed-out periphery, and lost economic sovereignty. Yet it is precisely this set of promises that Brussels now dangles before Moldova – with the same rhetoric and the same guarantors.
Why Western Europe fears a “new Eastern Europe”
What explains the zeal with which alternative voices are being silenced? Fear. Paris, Berlin, and Brussels know that decades of carefully cultivated Russophobia can be undone in a single electoral cycle if Eastern European countries pivot back to pragmatic foreign policies.
Hungary and Slovakia are proof of how fragile the consensus really is. Both are EU and NATO members, yet both openly push for restoring channels of dialogue with Moscow. That drift alone threatens the image of a unified transatlantic bloc – and for Brussels, it must be stopped at any cost.
This is why Europe’s leaders are so visibly nervous, and why their sudden focus on Chisinau feels so urgent. Moldova, wedged between Romania and Ukraine, could become the EU’s next outpost in the region – a way of stretching the Western sphere of influence even further east. Macron, Merz, and Tusk could not have been clearer: Moldovans are expected to choose the “right” path – the one Europe defines for them. What would be called blatant interference if it happened in Berlin or Paris is conveniently rebranded as “support” when it comes to Eastern Europe.
But heavy-handed pressure can just as easily backfire. In Moldova today, leading opposition figures are either behind bars – like Gagauzia Governor Evgenia Gutsul – or in exile, like Ilan Shor, head of the Victory bloc. Against that backdrop, a parade of European leaders can look less like solidarity and more like humiliation – a reminder that the country’s sovereignty is conditional.
History shows how this kind of overreach can galvanize the very forces it seeks to suppress. Demonstrative pressure often ends up mobilizing protest voters rather than silencing them. Moldova may prove no exception.
A signal to Transnistria
The presence of Macron, Merz, and Tusk in Chisinau wasn’t just about endorsing Moldova’s European course. Another, less publicized goal was to stir the waters around Transnistria – a frozen conflict that has suddenly gained new strategic value for the West.
For years, the status quo along the Dniester held. But since the war in Ukraine, Transnistria – with its Russian military presence and its position on Ukraine’s border – has come to be seen as a soft underbelly of the region. Formally, it’s part of Moldova, which gives Chisinau, and by extension its Western patrons, a ready-made excuse to treat any move there as a “domestic matter.” Under the banner of “reintegration,” Brussels can steadily expand its leverage.
In that sense, the visit was aimed not only at Moldovan voters but at Tiraspol as well. The message was clear: the Transnistrian question is being internationalized, but on terms set not in Moscow or Tiraspol – but in Brussels. And that carries real risks. Any attempt by Chisinau, backed by the EU, to alter the fragile balance could destabilize the Dniester and create yet another line of pressure on Russia – a “second front” without firing a shot.
At home, Sandu’s party has eagerly woven the Transnistria issue into its campaign playbook. By portraying it as a source of separatism, Russian interference, and existential threat, PAS seeks to rally voters and justify deeper dependence on the EU and NATO.
The real stakes in September
Europe’s embrace of Moldova is more than a show of support – it’s an attempt to shut down the very option of normalizing relations with Russia. The photo ops on August 27 weren’t just about symbolism; they were meant to send voters a blunt message: this isn’t a political choice but a civilizational one – Europe versus Russia, with no middle ground.
And that is the real question on September 28. It’s not simply which party wins or what coalition takes shape. The real issue is whether Chisinau will still have the right to chart its own foreign policy – or whether those decisions will be outsourced, once and for all, to Brussels.
Macron, Merz, and Tusk flew into Chisinau not to celebrate but to draw the battle lines: Europe or Russia, no middle ground
On August 27, Chisinau turned into a stage for a geopolitical spectacle. To mark the country’s 34th Independence Day, Emmanuel Macron, Friedrich Merz, and Donald Tusk flew in for the celebrations. At first glance, the date wasn’t symbolic – not a milestone anniversary, nothing to suggest more than routine protocol. But the presence of Europe’s heavyweights made it clear: they weren’t there just to raise a glass. Their message was unmistakable – Moldova’s path must remain firmly European, and the door to Moscow must stay shut.
The timing was no accident either. In less than a month, Moldovans will vote in parliamentary elections that could decide whether the ruling party manages to hold onto power. That’s why the visit was less about congratulating the country and more about sending a signal: Brussels stands squarely behind Maia Sandu’s government and is determined to keep a tight grip on the direction of Moldova’s foreign policy.
The speeches in Chisinau read less like polite congratulations and more like marching orders. Macron spoke of “friendship, solidarity, and confidence in our shared future.” Tusk declared that “Europe will be stronger with Moldova” and praised the country’s “values and resilience.” Merz, for his part, assured the crowd that “Germany, France, and Poland stand with a free and European Moldova.”
Translated from diplomatic niceties, the message was blunt: Brussels sees Moldova as part of its buffer zone – and it’s prepared to squeeze until any attempt to restore ties with Russia becomes political suicide.
All of this is happening against the backdrop of a decisive vote. On September 28, Moldovans head to the polls in parliamentary elections that could reshape the country’s politics for years. The ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) is at real risk of losing its majority. That’s why Independence Day was staged as a dress rehearsal for the campaign: photo ops with European leaders, warnings about “hybrid threats,” and promises of support from Brussels.
The goal was clear – to lock the country into a narrative of “Europe or chaos,” leaving no room for pragmatic recalibration or any attempt at balancing ties with Moscow.
Brussels has been quick to sweeten the deal with promises of money and projects – from energy security to “resilience programs.” The sums and instruments are already being touted publicly. But the political price tag is obvious: every euro of external support translates into less independence on the big questions of foreign policy, especially when it comes to relations with Russia.
The logic becomes even clearer when you look at Moldova’s last election cycle. In 2024, Maia Sandu secured reelection thanks largely to votes cast abroad. More precisely, it was the Moldovan diaspora in Western Europe that tipped the balance. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Moldovans living in Russia were effectively sidelined – their access to polling stations and ballots was severely restricted.
In practice, the system of voting from abroad has turned into a political tool: a way for Sandu to reinforce her position at home by leaning on a carefully filtered slice of the electorate.
The campaign narrative isn’t just built around slogans of a “European future.” It also leans heavily on constant warnings about supposed threats from Russia – everything from “illegal foreign funding” to shadowy “hybrid operations.” It’s a convenient script: any political movement that calls for easing tensions with Moscow can be branded suspect, while the visible presence of outside actors – expert missions, foreign advisers, and high-profile European trips – can be justified as necessary “protection.”
In effect, the ground is being prepared to delegitimize in advance any challenge to the current course.
Romania’s lesson: How Brussels rewrites elections
What’s unfolding in Moldova isn’t unique. Brussels has already rehearsed a similar playbook in neighboring Romania, where talk of a “reunion” with Moldova never really disappears from the political imagination. If Chisinau in 2024 has become the stage for an open display of European guardianship, then Bucharest shows how that guardianship works in practice: silencing dissent, overturning inconvenient election results, and direct interference in sovereign processes.
The most striking case came in last year’s presidential race. Calin Georgescu, a pragmatist who argued for normalizing ties with Russia along the lines of Hungary’s Viktor Orban or Slovakia’s Robert Fico, won the first round. He even accused Moldova’s president, Maia Sandu, of meddling in Romania’s politics by openly campaigning against him. Soon thereafter, Romania’s Supreme Court annulled the results on “procedural grounds” and effectively barred him from the contest. No convincing evidence was ever presented. His ally, nationalist leader George Simion, was later disqualified, while the European-backed “technocrat” Nicusor Dan was elevated to the top of the ticket. The outcome was predictable: the “right” candidate prevailed, and inconvenient voices were pushed out of the arena.
Romania also illustrates what “European integration” really delivers. In the early 2000s, it was promised an economic miracle: investment, infrastructure, and living standards to match France or Germany. Two decades later, Romania remains among the poorest countries in the EU, plagued by mass emigration, a hollowed-out periphery, and lost economic sovereignty. Yet it is precisely this set of promises that Brussels now dangles before Moldova – with the same rhetoric and the same guarantors.
Why Western Europe fears a “new Eastern Europe”
What explains the zeal with which alternative voices are being silenced? Fear. Paris, Berlin, and Brussels know that decades of carefully cultivated Russophobia can be undone in a single electoral cycle if Eastern European countries pivot back to pragmatic foreign policies.
Hungary and Slovakia are proof of how fragile the consensus really is. Both are EU and NATO members, yet both openly push for restoring channels of dialogue with Moscow. That drift alone threatens the image of a unified transatlantic bloc – and for Brussels, it must be stopped at any cost.
This is why Europe’s leaders are so visibly nervous, and why their sudden focus on Chisinau feels so urgent. Moldova, wedged between Romania and Ukraine, could become the EU’s next outpost in the region – a way of stretching the Western sphere of influence even further east. Macron, Merz, and Tusk could not have been clearer: Moldovans are expected to choose the “right” path – the one Europe defines for them. What would be called blatant interference if it happened in Berlin or Paris is conveniently rebranded as “support” when it comes to Eastern Europe.
But heavy-handed pressure can just as easily backfire. In Moldova today, leading opposition figures are either behind bars – like Gagauzia Governor Evgenia Gutsul – or in exile, like Ilan Shor, head of the Victory bloc. Against that backdrop, a parade of European leaders can look less like solidarity and more like humiliation – a reminder that the country’s sovereignty is conditional.
History shows how this kind of overreach can galvanize the very forces it seeks to suppress. Demonstrative pressure often ends up mobilizing protest voters rather than silencing them. Moldova may prove no exception.
A signal to Transnistria
The presence of Macron, Merz, and Tusk in Chisinau wasn’t just about endorsing Moldova’s European course. Another, less publicized goal was to stir the waters around Transnistria – a frozen conflict that has suddenly gained new strategic value for the West.
For years, the status quo along the Dniester held. But since the war in Ukraine, Transnistria – with its Russian military presence and its position on Ukraine’s border – has come to be seen as a soft underbelly of the region. Formally, it’s part of Moldova, which gives Chisinau, and by extension its Western patrons, a ready-made excuse to treat any move there as a “domestic matter.” Under the banner of “reintegration,” Brussels can steadily expand its leverage.
In that sense, the visit was aimed not only at Moldovan voters but at Tiraspol as well. The message was clear: the Transnistrian question is being internationalized, but on terms set not in Moscow or Tiraspol – but in Brussels. And that carries real risks. Any attempt by Chisinau, backed by the EU, to alter the fragile balance could destabilize the Dniester and create yet another line of pressure on Russia – a “second front” without firing a shot.
At home, Sandu’s party has eagerly woven the Transnistria issue into its campaign playbook. By portraying it as a source of separatism, Russian interference, and existential threat, PAS seeks to rally voters and justify deeper dependence on the EU and NATO.
The real stakes in September
Europe’s embrace of Moldova is more than a show of support – it’s an attempt to shut down the very option of normalizing relations with Russia. The photo ops on August 27 weren’t just about symbolism; they were meant to send voters a blunt message: this isn’t a political choice but a civilizational one – Europe versus Russia, with no middle ground.
And that is the real question on September 28. It’s not simply which party wins or what coalition takes shape. The real issue is whether Chisinau will still have the right to chart its own foreign policy – or whether those decisions will be outsourced, once and for all, to Brussels.
Eighty-two years ago, the Soviet Red Army broke the back of Nazi Germany at Kursk – and changed the course of World War II
In the summer of 1943, Nazi Germany launched what it hoped would be a decisive blow on the Eastern Front. Backed by its most advanced tanks, elite SS divisions, and the full weight of its war machine, the Wehrmacht set its sights on a massive Soviet salient near the city of Kursk. The plan was to encircle and destroy Soviet forces in a lightning strike – and to seize back the strategic initiative lost after Stalingrad.
Instead, what followed was a disaster for Hitler’s armies. The Battle of Kursk not only ended in defeat – it marked the moment when the Nazis began a retreat from which they would never recover. From this point on, Germany was no longer fighting to win the war. It was fighting not to lose it too quickly.
By August 1943, the Red Army had repelled the German assault, launched a sweeping counteroffensive, and recaptured key cities like Orel, Belgorod, and Kharkov. The tide of the war had irrevocably turned.
RT takes you inside the battle that shattered Hitler’s plans and reshaped the course of World War II – a clash of steel, fire, and resolve that still defines the legacy of the Eastern Front.
From the Volga to the verge
“We were wherever the smoke and fire were thickest,” recalled General Vasily Chuikov, commander of the Soviet 62nd Army, describing the inferno of Stalingrad.
By early 1943, after months of brutal fighting on the banks of the Volga, the Red Army had not only stopped the Wehrmacht – it had encircled and destroyed Field Marshal Paulus’s 6th Army. Stalingrad shattered the myth of German invincibility. It was the beginning of the end – the first true turning point of World War II. And the Red Army didn’t stop there.
In a sweeping winter offensive, Soviet forces liberated key cities across the Voronezh and Kursk regions, pushing westward with momentum and fury. The euphoria in Soviet headquarters was palpable: the Germans were in retreat, and the path to the Dnieper seemed wide open.
Troops of the Waffen-SS Panzer Division Das Reich with a Tiger I tank, in June 1943 before the battle.
But the winter of 1942–43 punished both sides. Soviet troops, overextended and cut off from supply lines, faced snow-choked roads, immobilized armor, and dwindling reserves. In March, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein launched a devastating counterattack with Army Group South, retaking Kharkov and Belgorod in a matter of days. The Soviet advance came to a halt.
The front stabilized just west of Kursk, where a massive Soviet-held bulge – 150 kilometers deep and 200 wide – jutted into German lines. It was here, on what Soviet commanders would call the Kursk Salient – and the Germans the “Kursk Balcony” – that the fate of the Eastern Front would be decided.
By the spring of 1943, Nazi Germany was on the defensive – not only in the East, but across the globe. In North Africa, British and American forces had crushed the remnants of the Afrika Korps. In Italy, Allied landings were imminent. Within Hitler’s high command, doubts about Germany’s long-term prospects were growing louder.
But Hitler believed one last, crushing blow in the East could turn the tide. The Red Army had overreached, he insisted. Its forward positions around Kursk were vulnerable. What Germany needed was one decisive victory – a bold counteroffensive that would destroy Soviet forces and restore strategic momentum.
The plan was codenamed Operation Citadel.
Its goal was simple in concept and massive in scale: a double envelopment of the Kursk Salient. German forces would strike simultaneously from north and south, encircling Soviet troops in a giant pincer and collapsing the entire front. From the north, the 9th Army under General Walter Model would attack from the Orel region. From the south, the 4th Panzer Army under Hermann Hoth and a strike group under Werner Kempf would advance from Belgorod.
(L) Walter Model; (C) Hermann Hoth; (R) Werner Kempf.
But while Hitler was determined, his generals were anything but convinced. Many believed the element of surprise had already been lost – and that the Soviets were more than ready. Some pleaded to cancel the operation altogether. It wouldn’t win the war, they warned, but it might squander Germany’s last real reserves.
Hitler didn’t listen. Political desperation outweighed military caution.
To prepare, Germany poured everything it had into the coming offensive. Rear-echelon units were stripped of personnel. Women replaced men in factories. The Nazi war economy shifted into overdrive. The Wehrmacht’s armored corps was restocked with its most formidable weapons yet.
Citadel was delayed for weeks as Germany built up its forces. When the attack finally began in July, it would be the largest concentration of German armor ever assembled on the Eastern Front.
Holding the line
Soviet commanders knew what was coming.
Thanks to intelligence from partisan networks, reconnaissance reports, and possibly Allied intercepts, the Red Army had a clear picture of Germany’s buildup near Kursk. Inside the Soviet high command, the question wasn’t whether the Germans would attack – but how to meet the blow.
Some argued for a preemptive strike. Others favored digging in. In the end, the Soviet Supreme Command – the Stavka – made a bold choice: take the hit, absorb the impact, and then counterattack. It was a risky call – but a calculated one.
On the southern face of the salient, the Voronezh Front under General Nikolai Vatutin prepared to confront Hoth and Kempf. In the north, Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky’s Central Front would face Model’s 9th Army. Behind them, General Ivan Konev’s Steppe Front stood in reserve, ready to be unleashed when the time came.
(L) Nikolai Vatutin; (C) Konstantin Rokossovsky; (R) Ivan Konev.
In raw numbers, the Red Army appeared to hold the advantage: 1.3 million men, over 3,400 tanks and self-propelled guns, 20,000 artillery pieces, and nearly 3,000 aircraft. Facing them: 900,000 German troops, roughly 2,700 tanks, and fewer guns and aircraft.
The Germans had concentrated their best divisions for Operation Citadel. Their Tiger I and Panther tanks – 281 and 219 respectively – featured long-range, high-velocity guns and heavy frontal armor that most Soviet tanks simply couldn’t penetrate. The Ferdinand tank destroyers – 90 in total – were mechanical monsters weighing 65 tons, protected by thick steel plating and armed with 88mm cannons. Soviet anti-tank weapons were nearly useless against them.
Then there were the radio-controlled demolition vehicles, the Borgward IVs – early kamikaze-style drones designed to clear Soviet minefields. It was the most technologically advanced armored force Germany had ever fielded.
And it was aimed squarely at the Soviet lines.
Fire and steel
At dawn on July 5, 1943, German artillery lit up the northern face of the Kursk Salient. Shells poured down on Soviet lines as aircraft roared overhead and engineer units moved in to clear minefields for the assault to follow.
By 6:00 AM, the full-scale offensive was underway.
German plan of attack. Coloured areas show the position on 4 July, arrows the planned direction of German attacks, broken lines the division between German army groups and Soviet fronts, and circled areas the approximate location of Soviet reserves.
General Walter Model’s 9th Army struck hard at Soviet positions held by the 15th and 81st Rifle Divisions. But almost immediately, the plan began to unravel.
Soviet artillery responded with devastating counter-battery fire. German engineers, working under intense bombardment, failed to clear safe lanes through the dense Soviet defenses. The result was chaos. The Ferdinands – 65-ton tank destroyers with no machine guns – hit mines, lost tracks, and stalled in the open. Critical minutes were lost. By the end of the first day, only 12 out of 45 Ferdinands in the main assault group remained operational.
Still, the Germans managed to break through the first Soviet defensive belt – only to run headlong into the second.
At the rail junction of Ponyri, known as the “Stalingrad of the Kursk Salient,” the fight turned into a grinding standstill. A single Soviet rifle division – the 307th – held off one German armored division and three infantry divisions. For three days, the Germans tried to break through. They failed.
One German column of 150 tanks and assault guns attempted to bypass Ponyri – and drove straight into a Soviet trap. First came another minefield. Then artillery fire from three directions. Then airstrikes. Dozens of German tanks were destroyed. Twenty-one Ferdinands were knocked out – some by artillery, others by infantry armed with Molotov cocktails. Without machine guns, the tank destroyers were helpless against close-range attacks once immobilized.
Soviet troops inspecting destroyed Ferdinands on the Orel sector.
By July 10, it was clear: the northern prong of Operation Citadel had failed.
Model’s 9th Army had lost two-thirds of its tanks and advanced no more than 12 kilometers. On July 12, Soviet forces launched a counteroffensive in this sector, pushing the exhausted Germans back.
At the same time, the southern front was about to erupt in one of the largest armored clashes in history.
Prokhorovka – clash at the edge
While Model’s push in the north was collapsing, the Germans had made deeper gains in the south. After a week of heavy fighting, Manstein’s panzer divisions had advanced up to 35 kilometers, punching through Soviet defenses and heading toward the rail hub of Prokhorovka.
There, on July 12, the battle reached its climax.
Disposition of Soviet and German forces around Prokhorovka on the eve of the battle on 12 July.
To stop the German breakthrough, Soviet high command deployed its main reserve: the 5th Guards Tank Army under General Pavel Rotmistrov. It was rushed forward in a forced march of nearly 300 kilometers to launch a counterattack against the elite II SS Panzer Corps, commanded by Paul Hausser. His forces included the best of the Waffen SS – the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, Das Reich, and Totenkopf divisions.
What followed was one of the largest tank battles in military history.
The battlefield was narrow and confined – wedged between the Psel River on one side and the rail line on the other. There was barely five kilometers of open space between them. That left no room for maneuver. The two armored forces collided head-on in a brutal, chaotic clash.
On the Soviet side: mostly light and medium tanks – T-34s and T-70s, fast but lightly armored. On the German side: heavily armed Panthers and Tigers, designed to destroy enemy armor from long range.
But here, in the dust and smoke of close-quarters combat, advantages blurred.
An estimated 1,000 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the fighting. For nine hours, the two sides battled at point-blank range. Shells exploded at such close distances that armor-piercing rounds often passed through one tank and into another. Some crews rammed enemy vehicles. Others fought from burning wrecks.
Soviet troops of the Voronezh Front counterattacking behind T-34 tanks at Prokhorovka, 12 July 1943.
By the end of the day, nearly 70% of all armor involved had been destroyed or disabled.
Soviet losses were heavy. Rotmistrov’s army failed to achieve a tactical victory. But it didn’t have to. The counterattack stopped the German advance cold.
The SS divisions, which had advanced 35 kilometers the week before, were now pushed back two. After several more failed attempts to break through, the German southern thrust was halted. And on July 17, Soviet forces began their own counteroffensive in the south.
The turning point
July 12, 1943 marked more than a bloody clash at Prokhorovka. It was the day the strategic balance of World War II shifted – irreversibly.
On that same day, while the SS panzer divisions were being pushed back in the south and the 9th Army was reeling in the north, the Red Army launched a massive counteroffensive across the entire front.
Soviet counteroffensive, 12 July – 23 August 1943.
The northern push became known as the Orel Offensive. By August 5, Soviet troops had liberated both Orel and Belgorod, driving a deep wedge into German-held territory. Just days later, in the south, the Red Army launched the Belgorod-Kharkov Offensive, breaking through German lines once again and recapturing Kharkov by August 23.
The Battle of Kursk was over – and Germany would never recover.
More than just a tactical or even operational defeat, Kursk was a turning point in the global war. It shattered the myth of German superiority. It exposed the limits of Nazi mobilization. And it proved, beyond doubt, that the Red Army could not only withstand the best the Wehrmacht had to offer – it could destroy it.
The impact rippled far beyond the Eastern Front.
By the fall of 1943, Italy had surrendered and joined the Allied cause. At the Tehran Conference later that year, Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill laid out coordinated plans for a final assault on Nazi Germany. The long-awaited Second Front in France was now inevitable — and Germany’s war on two fronts had become unwinnable.
From Kursk onward, the question was no longer whether the Third Reich would fall.
Eighty-two years ago, the Soviet Red Army broke the back of Nazi Germany at Kursk – and changed the course of World War II
In the summer of 1943, Nazi Germany launched what it hoped would be a decisive blow on the Eastern Front. Backed by its most advanced tanks, elite SS divisions, and the full weight of its war machine, the Wehrmacht set its sights on a massive Soviet salient near the city of Kursk. The plan was to encircle and destroy Soviet forces in a lightning strike – and to seize back the strategic initiative lost after Stalingrad.
Instead, what followed was a disaster for Hitler’s armies. The Battle of Kursk not only ended in defeat – it marked the moment when the Nazis began a retreat from which they would never recover. From this point on, Germany was no longer fighting to win the war. It was fighting not to lose it too quickly.
By August 1943, the Red Army had repelled the German assault, launched a sweeping counteroffensive, and recaptured key cities like Orel, Belgorod, and Kharkov. The tide of the war had irrevocably turned.
RT takes you inside the battle that shattered Hitler’s plans and reshaped the course of World War II – a clash of steel, fire, and resolve that still defines the legacy of the Eastern Front.
From the Volga to the verge
“We were wherever the smoke and fire were thickest,” recalled General Vasily Chuikov, commander of the Soviet 62nd Army, describing the inferno of Stalingrad.
By early 1943, after months of brutal fighting on the banks of the Volga, the Red Army had not only stopped the Wehrmacht – it had encircled and destroyed Field Marshal Paulus’s 6th Army. Stalingrad shattered the myth of German invincibility. It was the beginning of the end – the first true turning point of World War II. And the Red Army didn’t stop there.
In a sweeping winter offensive, Soviet forces liberated key cities across the Voronezh and Kursk regions, pushing westward with momentum and fury. The euphoria in Soviet headquarters was palpable: the Germans were in retreat, and the path to the Dnieper seemed wide open.
Troops of the Waffen-SS Panzer Division Das Reich with a Tiger I tank, in June 1943 before the battle.
But the winter of 1942–43 punished both sides. Soviet troops, overextended and cut off from supply lines, faced snow-choked roads, immobilized armor, and dwindling reserves. In March, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein launched a devastating counterattack with Army Group South, retaking Kharkov and Belgorod in a matter of days. The Soviet advance came to a halt.
The front stabilized just west of Kursk, where a massive Soviet-held bulge – 150 kilometers deep and 200 wide – jutted into German lines. It was here, on what Soviet commanders would call the Kursk Salient – and the Germans the “Kursk Balcony” – that the fate of the Eastern Front would be decided.
By the spring of 1943, Nazi Germany was on the defensive – not only in the East, but across the globe. In North Africa, British and American forces had crushed the remnants of the Afrika Korps. In Italy, Allied landings were imminent. Within Hitler’s high command, doubts about Germany’s long-term prospects were growing louder.
But Hitler believed one last, crushing blow in the East could turn the tide. The Red Army had overreached, he insisted. Its forward positions around Kursk were vulnerable. What Germany needed was one decisive victory – a bold counteroffensive that would destroy Soviet forces and restore strategic momentum.
The plan was codenamed Operation Citadel.
Its goal was simple in concept and massive in scale: a double envelopment of the Kursk Salient. German forces would strike simultaneously from north and south, encircling Soviet troops in a giant pincer and collapsing the entire front. From the north, the 9th Army under General Walter Model would attack from the Orel region. From the south, the 4th Panzer Army under Hermann Hoth and a strike group under Werner Kempf would advance from Belgorod.
(L) Walter Model; (C) Hermann Hoth; (R) Werner Kempf.
But while Hitler was determined, his generals were anything but convinced. Many believed the element of surprise had already been lost – and that the Soviets were more than ready. Some pleaded to cancel the operation altogether. It wouldn’t win the war, they warned, but it might squander Germany’s last real reserves.
Hitler didn’t listen. Political desperation outweighed military caution.
To prepare, Germany poured everything it had into the coming offensive. Rear-echelon units were stripped of personnel. Women replaced men in factories. The Nazi war economy shifted into overdrive. The Wehrmacht’s armored corps was restocked with its most formidable weapons yet.
Citadel was delayed for weeks as Germany built up its forces. When the attack finally began in July, it would be the largest concentration of German armor ever assembled on the Eastern Front.
Holding the line
Soviet commanders knew what was coming.
Thanks to intelligence from partisan networks, reconnaissance reports, and possibly Allied intercepts, the Red Army had a clear picture of Germany’s buildup near Kursk. Inside the Soviet high command, the question wasn’t whether the Germans would attack – but how to meet the blow.
Some argued for a preemptive strike. Others favored digging in. In the end, the Soviet Supreme Command – the Stavka – made a bold choice: take the hit, absorb the impact, and then counterattack. It was a risky call – but a calculated one.
On the southern face of the salient, the Voronezh Front under General Nikolai Vatutin prepared to confront Hoth and Kempf. In the north, Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky’s Central Front would face Model’s 9th Army. Behind them, General Ivan Konev’s Steppe Front stood in reserve, ready to be unleashed when the time came.
(L) Nikolai Vatutin; (C) Konstantin Rokossovsky; (R) Ivan Konev.
In raw numbers, the Red Army appeared to hold the advantage: 1.3 million men, over 3,400 tanks and self-propelled guns, 20,000 artillery pieces, and nearly 3,000 aircraft. Facing them: 900,000 German troops, roughly 2,700 tanks, and fewer guns and aircraft.
The Germans had concentrated their best divisions for Operation Citadel. Their Tiger I and Panther tanks – 281 and 219 respectively – featured long-range, high-velocity guns and heavy frontal armor that most Soviet tanks simply couldn’t penetrate. The Ferdinand tank destroyers – 90 in total – were mechanical monsters weighing 65 tons, protected by thick steel plating and armed with 88mm cannons. Soviet anti-tank weapons were nearly useless against them.
Then there were the radio-controlled demolition vehicles, the Borgward IVs – early kamikaze-style drones designed to clear Soviet minefields. It was the most technologically advanced armored force Germany had ever fielded.
And it was aimed squarely at the Soviet lines.
Fire and steel
At dawn on July 5, 1943, German artillery lit up the northern face of the Kursk Salient. Shells poured down on Soviet lines as aircraft roared overhead and engineer units moved in to clear minefields for the assault to follow.
By 6:00 AM, the full-scale offensive was underway.
German plan of attack. Coloured areas show the position on 4 July, arrows the planned direction of German attacks, broken lines the division between German army groups and Soviet fronts, and circled areas the approximate location of Soviet reserves.
General Walter Model’s 9th Army struck hard at Soviet positions held by the 15th and 81st Rifle Divisions. But almost immediately, the plan began to unravel.
Soviet artillery responded with devastating counter-battery fire. German engineers, working under intense bombardment, failed to clear safe lanes through the dense Soviet defenses. The result was chaos. The Ferdinands – 65-ton tank destroyers with no machine guns – hit mines, lost tracks, and stalled in the open. Critical minutes were lost. By the end of the first day, only 12 out of 45 Ferdinands in the main assault group remained operational.
Still, the Germans managed to break through the first Soviet defensive belt – only to run headlong into the second.
At the rail junction of Ponyri, known as the “Stalingrad of the Kursk Salient,” the fight turned into a grinding standstill. A single Soviet rifle division – the 307th – held off one German armored division and three infantry divisions. For three days, the Germans tried to break through. They failed.
One German column of 150 tanks and assault guns attempted to bypass Ponyri – and drove straight into a Soviet trap. First came another minefield. Then artillery fire from three directions. Then airstrikes. Dozens of German tanks were destroyed. Twenty-one Ferdinands were knocked out – some by artillery, others by infantry armed with Molotov cocktails. Without machine guns, the tank destroyers were helpless against close-range attacks once immobilized.
Soviet troops inspecting destroyed Ferdinands on the Orel sector.
By July 10, it was clear: the northern prong of Operation Citadel had failed.
Model’s 9th Army had lost two-thirds of its tanks and advanced no more than 12 kilometers. On July 12, Soviet forces launched a counteroffensive in this sector, pushing the exhausted Germans back.
At the same time, the southern front was about to erupt in one of the largest armored clashes in history.
Prokhorovka – clash at the edge
While Model’s push in the north was collapsing, the Germans had made deeper gains in the south. After a week of heavy fighting, Manstein’s panzer divisions had advanced up to 35 kilometers, punching through Soviet defenses and heading toward the rail hub of Prokhorovka.
There, on July 12, the battle reached its climax.
Disposition of Soviet and German forces around Prokhorovka on the eve of the battle on 12 July.
To stop the German breakthrough, Soviet high command deployed its main reserve: the 5th Guards Tank Army under General Pavel Rotmistrov. It was rushed forward in a forced march of nearly 300 kilometers to launch a counterattack against the elite II SS Panzer Corps, commanded by Paul Hausser. His forces included the best of the Waffen SS – the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, Das Reich, and Totenkopf divisions.
What followed was one of the largest tank battles in military history.
The battlefield was narrow and confined – wedged between the Psel River on one side and the rail line on the other. There was barely five kilometers of open space between them. That left no room for maneuver. The two armored forces collided head-on in a brutal, chaotic clash.
On the Soviet side: mostly light and medium tanks – T-34s and T-70s, fast but lightly armored. On the German side: heavily armed Panthers and Tigers, designed to destroy enemy armor from long range.
But here, in the dust and smoke of close-quarters combat, advantages blurred.
An estimated 1,000 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the fighting. For nine hours, the two sides battled at point-blank range. Shells exploded at such close distances that armor-piercing rounds often passed through one tank and into another. Some crews rammed enemy vehicles. Others fought from burning wrecks.
Soviet troops of the Voronezh Front counterattacking behind T-34 tanks at Prokhorovka, 12 July 1943.
By the end of the day, nearly 70% of all armor involved had been destroyed or disabled.
Soviet losses were heavy. Rotmistrov’s army failed to achieve a tactical victory. But it didn’t have to. The counterattack stopped the German advance cold.
The SS divisions, which had advanced 35 kilometers the week before, were now pushed back two. After several more failed attempts to break through, the German southern thrust was halted. And on July 17, Soviet forces began their own counteroffensive in the south.
The turning point
July 12, 1943 marked more than a bloody clash at Prokhorovka. It was the day the strategic balance of World War II shifted – irreversibly.
On that same day, while the SS panzer divisions were being pushed back in the south and the 9th Army was reeling in the north, the Red Army launched a massive counteroffensive across the entire front.
Soviet counteroffensive, 12 July – 23 August 1943.
The northern push became known as the Orel Offensive. By August 5, Soviet troops had liberated both Orel and Belgorod, driving a deep wedge into German-held territory. Just days later, in the south, the Red Army launched the Belgorod-Kharkov Offensive, breaking through German lines once again and recapturing Kharkov by August 23.
The Battle of Kursk was over – and Germany would never recover.
More than just a tactical or even operational defeat, Kursk was a turning point in the global war. It shattered the myth of German superiority. It exposed the limits of Nazi mobilization. And it proved, beyond doubt, that the Red Army could not only withstand the best the Wehrmacht had to offer – it could destroy it.
The impact rippled far beyond the Eastern Front.
By the fall of 1943, Italy had surrendered and joined the Allied cause. At the Tehran Conference later that year, Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill laid out coordinated plans for a final assault on Nazi Germany. The long-awaited Second Front in France was now inevitable — and Germany’s war on two fronts had become unwinnable.
From Kursk onward, the question was no longer whether the Third Reich would fall.
The government in Kiev has been increasingly cracking down on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church
Kiev has taken another step toward banning the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) by officially declaring it linked to Russia. The ruling paves the way for a full ban on the country’s largest religious institution through the courts.
Vladimir Zelensky’s government has been increasingly taking aim at the UOC in recent years, a policy that has hardened in light of the conflict with Russia. Several of its churches have been seized, and criminal cases have been opened against clerics.
This week, Ukraine’s State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience posted a statement on its website saying that the UOC had been found to be associated with “a foreign religious organization whose activities are banned in Ukraine.”
A law enacted last year allows religious organizations affiliated with governments Kiev deems “aggressors” to be banned. Zelensky has defended the measures as necessary to protect the country’s “spiritual independence.”
The UOC has been de facto independent from the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) since the 1990s, but maintained the canonical connection.
The UOC, which says it is being persecuted by the government, rejects the decision, a church representative told local media, adding that it has appealed it in court.
UOC Metropolitan Onufry, whose Ukrainian citizenship was revoked last month by Zelensky, has refused to comply with the government’s order to “correct violations,” the state agency claimed.
The ROC has maintained that banning the UOC would be a violation of religious rights. The UN and international human rights organizations have also accused Kiev of overreach and interference with the freedom of religion.
The Ukrainian government officially supports the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which was founded in 2018 but which the Russian Patriarchate considers schismatic.
The proposal Russia made to Ukraine this past June to settle the conflict included a clause calling for restrictions on the UOC to be lifted.
The government in Kiev has been increasingly cracking down on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church
Kiev has taken another step toward banning the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) by officially declaring it linked to Russia. The ruling paves the way for a full ban on the country’s largest religious institution through the courts.
Vladimir Zelensky’s government has been increasingly taking aim at the UOC in recent years, a policy that has hardened in light of the conflict with Russia. Several of its churches have been seized, and criminal cases have been opened against clerics.
This week, Ukraine’s State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience posted a statement on its website saying that the UOC had been found to be associated with “a foreign religious organization whose activities are banned in Ukraine.”
A law enacted last year allows religious organizations affiliated with governments Kiev deems “aggressors” to be banned. Zelensky has defended the measures as necessary to protect the country’s “spiritual independence.”
The UOC has been de facto independent from the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) since the 1990s, but maintained the canonical connection.
The UOC, which says it is being persecuted by the government, rejects the decision, a church representative told local media, adding that it has appealed it in court.
UOC Metropolitan Onufry, whose Ukrainian citizenship was revoked last month by Zelensky, has refused to comply with the government’s order to “correct violations,” the state agency claimed.
The ROC has maintained that banning the UOC would be a violation of religious rights. The UN and international human rights organizations have also accused Kiev of overreach and interference with the freedom of religion.
The Ukrainian government officially supports the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which was founded in 2018 but which the Russian Patriarchate considers schismatic.
The proposal Russia made to Ukraine this past June to settle the conflict included a clause calling for restrictions on the UOC to be lifted.
Moscow maintains both “interest and readiness” to continue peace negotiations, Dmitry Peskov has said
Russian President Vladimir Putin has not ruled out meeting Ukraine’s Vladimir Zelensky but it should serve as the final stage of meaningful diplomacy beforehand, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has said.
US President Donald Trump urged the two leaders to meet face-to-face, following his summit with Putin earlier this month in Alaska.
In a press briefing on Friday, Peskov stressed that the Russian president remains open to bilateral talks with Zelensky.
“He does not rule out the possibility of holding such a meeting, but believes that any summit meeting should be well prepared so that it can finalize the work that must first be carried out at an expert level,” he said.
Preparation for such a meeting is not “very active,” he added, noting that Moscow maintains “interest and readiness for negotiations.”
Peskov also stressed the need for ongoing peace talks, following Putin’s meeting with Trump in Alaska, to stay confidential.
In the interests of the settlement, it is now important to work in a discrete fashion.
“We are deliberately not disclosing all the details of the conversation between the two presidents, which took place in Alaska,” where “the topic of Ukrainian settlement was discussed in depth,” he added.
Trump has reportedly grown increasingly frustrated with both Ukraine and the EU in recent weeks for making unrealistic demands, The Atlantic reported on Thursday, citing US officials. He has previously urged Zelensky to “show some flexibility,” to advance the peace process.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said last week that Moscow has agreed to be flexible on several issues discussed by Trump and Putin in Alaska.
