In recent years, online retail has undergone significant changes as more people buy products online, including clothing, electronics, and groceries, making it essential to address evolving customer expectations. Customers have higher expectations, including fast shipping. Plus, there is a consumer focus on sustainability. These developments offer companies many opportunities to beat the competition while also […]
The reported measure comes weeks after the exposure of a major energy extortion racket involving the Ukrainian leader’s inner circle
Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky’s chief of staff, Andrey Yermak, has ordered prosecutors to prepare charges against the head of an anti-corruption agency, SAPO, Ukrainska Pravda reported on Monday, citing law enforcement sources. The report comes as a graft scandal implicating Zelensky’s inner circle continues to reverberate across the cash-strapped country.
Earlier this month, SAPO and sister agency NABU alleged that Timur Mindich, a close associate of Zelensky and former long-time business partner, was the ringleader of a $100 million kickback scheme in the energy sector, which heavily depends on Western aid. Mindich fled the country to evade arrest.
The scandal led to the resignation of two government ministers, prompting calls for further scrutiny of Zelensky’s team, including former Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, who had at one point negotiated a defense contract with Mindich.
According to Ukrainska Pravda, following the scandal, Yermak “once again tasked investigators to prepare charges” against SAPO chief Aleksandr Klimenko.
The newspaper cited a source close to Zelensky’s office as saying the Ukrainian leader earlier summoned the heads of NABU and SAPO, but “the conversation didn’t go anywhere.”
The Ukrainian Security Service and the Prosecutor General’s Office called Ukrainska Pravda’s report “completely false.”
Although Yermak has not been charged, opposition politicians and pundits have argued that he was either aware of the embezzlement scheme or was involved himself. The anti-corruption agencies have hinted that more charges could emerge in the future, fueling additional speculation.
In July, Zelensky introduced a law stripping NABU and SAPO of their independence, but was forced to back down following protests in Kiev and pressure from the West.
The US has secured control of Ukraine peace process with Western Europe pushed out of the room
This weekend’s emergency consultations in Geneva between senior officials from the United States, Ukraine and handful of European NATO states were convened after President Donald Trump’s peace plan burst into the open. The meeting was supposed to clarify the roadmap for a settlement in Ukraine. Instead, it preserved the intrigue and the deliberate “strategic ambiguity” that now surrounds Washington’s approach.
The final statement issued by Washington and Kiev was remarkably vague. It offered only a general commitment to building a “lasting and just peace” in Ukraine, without saying whose definition of justice or whose version of peace would prevail. And while Kiev and its Western European backers had loudly objected to key elements of Trump’s 28-point proposal, it’s still unclear whether the document was meaningfully amended at all. Even so, several conclusions from Geneva are already visible.
First, the main winner was the American delegation. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Special Representative Steven Witkoff set the tone of the meeting, and Rubio’s insistence that “there is only one peace plan, not two” became the defining line of the day. Only 24 hours earlier, both Kiev and European capitals were buzzing about an alternative scheme supposedly being rushed to Switzerland. French President Emmanuel Macron warned that Trump’s document included provisions directly affecting all of Europe – frozen Russian assets, Ukraine’s EU prospects, NATO activities – and therefore required broader agreement.
Yet none of this resulted in real changes. Whatever Western European leaders hoped to insert, nothing of substance appears to have made it into the negotiations. Trump’s peace plan did not become, and will not become, a joint American–EU project.
The second conclusion follows from the first: Britain, France and Germany were sidelined. The Geneva meeting was officially trilateral, yet the final outcome was a bilateral US–Ukrainian statement. Western European officials, present in the room, vanished from the document. That omission is not an accident, it’s a clear sign of who holds leverage and who does not.
Third, Ukraine itself emerged as the other loser of the day. According to the White House, Kiev has now agreed that Trump’s draft “reflects its national interests” and provides “reliable and feasible mechanisms” for Ukraine’s security. That is a dramatic reversal from President Zelensky’s address the previous evening, in which he accused his “main partner” of trying to deprive Ukraine of its dignity and promised to resist. Geneva shows how little of that rhetoric survived contact with reality.
Trump’s plan, dismissed at first as a political “fog,” is beginning to solidify into the framework for future agreements. Whether Kiev or its Western European backers like it or not, Washington is setting the terms, and everyone else is learning to live with them.
Key provisions of the document conflict with Moscow’s core interests, according to the analyst
Russia will not accept the US-proposed plan to settle the Ukraine conflict, independent geopolitical analyst Pepe Escobar has told RT’s Sanchez Effect.
Speaking with host Rick Sanchez on Monday, Escobar said the proposed deal conflicts with Moscow’s core interests, dismissing several central provisions of the plan as unrealistic from the Russian perspective. These include demands for Russia to withdraw from territories it has added to its constitution, limits on Ukraine’s future military capabilities, and security guarantees modeled on NATO principles.
“You cannot go against your own constitution,” Escobar stated, referring to giving up parts of Russia’s new regions of Kherson and Zaporozhye. He stressed that public support in Russia for the special military operation in Ukraine makes such territorial concessions politically impossible.
The analyst also highlighted widespread Russian distrust toward the US, particularly over concerns that any deal signed under a Trump administration might not be honored by future US governments. “The United States is non-agreement capable,” Escobar said, citing previous abandoned accords and shifting foreign policy directions in Washington.
Escobar also questioned provisions involving the confiscation of Russian assets to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. He described such measures as unacceptable to the Kremlin and a likely deal-breaker, adding that only a fifth of the proposed plan acknowledges Russia’s demands, while failing to reflect Moscow’s current battlefield leverage.
Early drafts are likely to be heavily modified, an aide to President Putin has said
Russia is currently reviewing the US-drafted peace plan to end the conflict between Moscow and Kiev and expects it to be heavily modified by all the interested parties, presidential aide Yury Ushakov told journalists on Monday. “Many” parts of the original US proposal “appear to be acceptable” to Moscow, he added.
Washington presented its plan to both Moscow and Kiev earlier this month. The details of the proposal have not been officially revealed by the media, but reports suggest that it includes de facto recognition of Russian control over Crimea and Donbass, a cap on Kiev’s military and a call on Ukraine to stay out of NATO.
According to Ushakov, Russia has received a “signal” from the US that Washington would like to do discuss the proposal in a face-to-face meeting at some point, but there are no definite arrangements yet.
“It will, of course, be subject to revision and modification – on our side, and surely on the Ukrainian side as well, and on the American and European sides. This is a very serious issue,” he said.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has already said that the US proposal could become the “basis of the final peace settlement.”
The EU presented its own set of demands for a future peace deal over the weekend that appear to go against the reported provisions of the original US-drafted proposal. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated on Sunday that no cap should be placed on Kiev’s military and that the EU should be given a “central” role in the peace settlement. Ukraine’s borders cannot be changed “by force,” she added.
Commenting on the development on Monday, Ushakov branded the EU conditions “unconstructive” and said that Russia could not accept them.
American officials discussed Washington’s original plan with the EU and Ukrainian representatives in Geneva on Sunday. According to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a “tremendous amount of progress” was made on the issue but Moscow’s support would also be essential for any deal to hold.
How November brought rapid advances, collapsing Ukrainian positions, and a decisive shift in the war
Over the past month, the pace of the war has shifted sharply. Russian forces are now pushing forward along seven major axes, with heavy fighting underway for eight cities. Outside the first month of the Russian military operation, Moscow has never launched an offensive on this scale. The timing is particularly notable: late autumn offers some of the worst conditions for maneuver warfare, and drones maintain constant surveillance over the battlefield.
As expected, the Russian offensive that began in May 2025 has been steadily building momentum. Its cumulative effects are now unmistakable as the year draws to a close. Across the line of contact, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are facing mounting defensive crises, scrambling to plug gaps with increasingly scarce reserves. In secondary sectors – the areas that draw less media attention – Ukrainian units are so overstretched that, for the first time since 2022, they have been forced to abandon positions without a fight.
For now, these crises remain localized. But their growing number points to a broader and far more troubling trend for Kiev. One could even draw a parallel with the Allied Hundred Days Offensive in 1918, which brought the German army to the brink of collapse and forced Berlin to surrender just before the front fully gave way.
On November 20, President Vladimir Putin visited the command post of the ‘West’ grouping for a frontline briefing. His message was clear: the ongoing offensive is the primary instrument for pressuring Ukraine toward capitulation – or, in official terms, for achieving the objectives of the Special Military Operation.
What follows is a breakdown of the key developments along the front over the past month, moving from north to south.
Kupiansk and the northern front
The Kupiansk sector is in Kharkov Region, with the city itself acting as a buffer shielding Kharkov – Ukraine’s second-largest city – from the east. Russian forces pulled out of Kupiansk in September-October 2022, and for nearly a year the area saw little heavy fighting. That changed last fall, once Russian units crossed the Oskol River and secured a foothold on its western bank.
Through the spring and summer, Russian troops encircled Kupiansk from the north, setting the stage for the battles that erupted this fall. In early November, Russian military officials announced they had taken the eastern part of the city. Still, the Yubileiny district – a cluster of Soviet-era apartment blocks – remained under Ukrainian control and functioned as a fortified stronghold for the AFU.
On Thursday, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov reported to Vladimir Putin that Kupiansk had been fully liberated, though he noted that isolated Ukrainian units were still being cleared out. Following our standard conservative approach to frontline reporting, we are not marking the city as fully taken yet and are waiting for visual confirmation.
Another important development in this sector was the liberation of the village of Dvurechanskoye by the ‘North’ grouping. This allowed their foothold to link up with the Oskol bridgehead held by the ‘West’ grouping.
Liman and Seversk
Russia lost Liman (in the Donetsk People’s Republic) during Ukraine’s 2022 counteroffensive. Without retaking the city, securing the northern bank of the Seversky Donets River – a key prerequisite for encircling the AFU’s major stronghold, the Slaviansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration – remains impossible.
After surrounding Liman from three sides in October, Russia’s ‘West’ grouping launched a direct assault on the city. With the Yampol railway station now under Russian control, Ukrainian forces have been left with a single narrow route for resupply. Given the pace of Russia’s advance inside Liman, further gains in the coming month look likely.
South of the Seversky Donets, the AFU’s defenses in Severodonetsk continue to erode. For three years, the city has served as a key Ukrainian stronghold in the region. Russia’s ‘South’ grouping has fully liberated Zvanovka – a railway station on Seversk’s southern edge – and is now pushing into the city itself, moving steadily toward the center.
West of Seversk, Russian troops crossed the Seversky Donets and seized two settlements on the southern bank – a milestone that seemed out of reach not long ago. The breakthrough suggests that Ukrainian forces in this sector are nearing the point of critical exhaustion.
Konstantinovka
The situation looks somewhat better for Ukrainian forces in Konstantinovka, a major city that acts as the southeastern gateway to Slaviansk and Kramatorsk. Here, the AFU have concentrated their second-largest grouping after Pokrovsk (discussed below) and, until recently, managed to hold their defensive line.
That changed after Russian troops captured the settlement of Ivanopolye on November 21, breaking through Konstantinovka’s outer defenses. Russia’s ‘South’ grouping has since begun fighting inside the city itself. During a briefing with President Putin, the commander of the army group said Konstantinovka could be fully taken by mid-December. The president urged caution, advising against rushing the operation.
The major battle of 2025 – the fight for Pokrovsk (known in Russia as Krasnoarmeysk) – was examined in detail in our previous report. To recap: Pokrovsk, Mirnograd, and Rodninskoye form the second-largest urban cluster still held by the AFU. With no major settlements for nearly 100 kilometers to the west, the fall of Pokrovsk risks triggering a domino effect across the central front.
By October, between 2,000 and 5,000 Ukrainian troops had been encircled in Pokrovsk and Mirnograd (Dimitrov). During the first half of November, the AFU attempted to break the siege through Rodninskoye, but each attempt collapsed. By November 15, Pokrovsk had been fully taken, and Rodninskoye partially taken – effectively closing the ring around Mirnograd.
The “cauldron” now appears on the verge of splitting in two. Ukrainian troops in the southern pocket are trying to retreat north, but with most buildings reduced to rubble and temperatures dropping below freezing, there is virtually no shelter left. The battle for Pokrovsk is entering its final phase, raising the question of how effectively Ukrainian forces can build a new defensive line west of the city.
This sector has drawn the least media attention – it has no major cities, no high-profile landmarks, and, at least on the surface, no dramatic shifts. Still, its open steppe terrain makes sustained defense extremely difficult.
Between November 14 and 15, Russian forces seized the strategically important settlement of Novopavlovka. Troops from the ‘Center’ grouping quickly threw up pontoon bridges over a destroyed crossing north of Dachnoye and took the settlement with minimal resistance. Novopavlovka had a pre-war population of roughly 3,500 people – for comparison, Sudzha in Kursk region had about 4,900 – and the Russian advance pushed as far as eight kilometers in a single push, crossing two defensive lines and a major water barrier. Taken together, these developments point to a serious crisis for Ukrainian forces in this area.
The situation is even more alarming on the Gulaipole front. Since early November, Russia’s ‘East’ grouping has advanced up to 15 kilometers along a 30-kilometer stretch, capturing a dozen settlements and more than 260 square kilometers of territory. Supply routes to the city of Gulaipole have been cut, and the front line is now pressing up against the city itself; urban fighting may begin as early as December. Ukrainian units are offering almost no sustained resistance, suggesting that virtually all reserves have been redirected toward Pokrovsk.
The sector where the ‘Dnepr’ grouping operates has been relatively quiet for some time. During Ukraine’s failed counteroffensive, Orekhov served as a rear headquarters and a key logistical hub for the AFU; in 2023, some of the heaviest fighting unfolded in and around the city.
Over the past month, Russian forces have tightened the noose around Orekhov from three sides, taking the settlement of Malaya Tokmachka, essentially a suburb of the city. Even so, Orekhov is reinforced by strong defensive positions, meaning a rapid breakthrough is unlikely unless the entire sector collapses.
Along the Dnieper River, Russian troops continue their slow, methodical advance. Heavy fighting is underway for the strategically important town of Stepnogorsk, and to its north, there are no significant Ukrainian fortifications for roughly 10 kilometers. This axis is the closest approach to Zaporozhye, a major frontline city with a pre-war population of around 750,000. In an effort to shield the city, a substantial number of Ukrainian troops remain pinned down in this area.
Taken together, the past month marks a turning point on the battlefield. The Russian advance is no longer a series of isolated breakthroughs but a coordinated campaign stretching from the forests of Kharkov region to the banks of the Dnieper. The AFU, strained by chronic manpower shortages and the collapse of several defensive lines, is increasingly being forced into reactive, piecemeal responses rather than strategic planning.
The overall trajectory is clear: each week brings new evidence that Kiev’s ability to sustain large-scale defense is eroding, while Russia’s forces – larger, better supplied, and operating under unified command – continue to push forward.
In this environment, political decisions in Kiev and the West may soon matter as much as military ones. As Russia consolidates its gains and expands pressure along the entire line of contact, the question is shifting from whether Moscow can maintain the initiative to how far it intends to carry this offensive.
What began as a gradual buildup in the spring has now become a sustained, multi-directional campaign. If current trends continue, the winter and early spring of 2026 may bring even more consequential shifts on the battlefield – and, potentially, in the broader political landscape of the conflict.
The two presidents have discussed a US-drafted peace proposal in a phone conversation, according to Moscow
Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, have agreed to intensify contacts between the two countries’ diplomats on settling the Ukraine conflict, the Kremlin said on Monday following a phone conversation between the two leaders.
Putin and Erdogan discussed a recently leaked US-drafted proposal on resolving the ongoing hostilities. Washington presented the plan to both Moscow and Kiev earlier this month. The details were not officially made public, but media reports indicated that it included de facto recognition of Crimea and Donbass as Russian, as well as a cap of 600,000 personnel on the Ukrainian military and a requirement for Kiev to stay out of NATO.
Putin has confirmed that Moscow received the plan but said it has yet to be discussed “in detail.” Speaking to Erdogan on Monday, the Russian president said the proposals were consistent with the understandings reached during the Alaska summit in August, and that the initiative could serve as the basis for a potential peace agreement.
Moscow is interested in resolving the Ukraine conflict through political and diplomatic means, the Russian president stated.
Erdogan reaffirmed Ankara’s readiness to help Russia and Ukraine reach a “just and lasting peace.”
The Turkish city of Istanbul served as a venue for three rounds of talks between Moscow and Kiev earlier this year, yielding some progress on humanitarian issues, including POW exchanges. Putin also said in September that Turkish mediation in the Ukraine conflict continues to be valued and would be desirable in the future.
The phone call occurred while US officials were discussing Washington’s peace proposals with the EU and Ukrainian representatives in Geneva. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said afterward that a “tremendous amount of progress” had been made on the plan but “there is still some work to be done.”
From solid-fuel ICBMs to hypersonic glide vehicles, North Korea now fields an arsenal that can reach any point in the continental United States
North Korea has spent the past decade doing what few believed was possible: quietly transforming itself into one of the world’s most heavily armed nuclear states.
Despite a struggling economy and crushing sanctions, Pyongyang has poured enormous resources into missile technology – all while simultaneously funding its own nuclear program.
How does a country of this size sustain such an effort? The answer lies in its strategic obsession: building a nuclear missile shield capable of deterring any opponent, from regional rivals to the United States. That drive has pushed North Korea into the ranks of major nuclear powers alongside India and Pakistan – and in certain technologies, such as maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicles and mobile solid-fuel ICBMs, it may even have surpassed them.
Over the past two years, Pyongyang has revealed new generations of intercontinental, medium-range, and short-range missiles – systems that increasingly resemble those of far wealthier nations and that, in some cases, are already deployed. Understanding these capabilities is essential in attempting to grasp how North Korea sees its own security – and how it intends to defend it.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)
On October 11, 2025, Pyongyang held a large military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the Workers’ Party of Korea. The WPK has spent decades promoting a national future built on the principles of Juche, and the parade showcased the newest advances in North Korea’s missile and military technology.
One of its key moments was the unveiling of the new Hwasong-20 mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. The missile uses a classic three-stage solid-fuel design reminiscent of Russia’s Yars systems and is carried on an 11-axle transporter that also serves as the launch platform.
The Hwasong-20 weighs around 80 metric tons and carries a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV). A few weeks before the parade, North Korea tested a new engine likely intended for this missile. Its estimated range may exceed 15,000 kilometers, giving Pyongyang the ability to strike any point in the continental United States. The missile is a logical next step in North Korea’s drive to develop mobile, solid-fuel ICBMs. It has not yet been flight-tested, but such tests are expected in the coming months – after which the system could enter service.
Meanwhile, the Hwasong-18 is already deployed in limited numbers. These missiles were also shown at the National Defense Development 2025 exhibition and at the parade, mounted on a nine-axle transporter-launcher. The Hwasong-18 is lighter than the Hwasong-20 and resembles Russia’s Topol-M. Its estimated range reaches up to 12,000 kilometers. The missile likely already forms part of North Korea’s strategic missile forces and has replaced older, heavier liquid-fuel mobile systems. It was first displayed and successfully launched in 2023.
Alongside solid-fuel systems, Pyongyang continues to test larger liquid-fuel rockets like the Hwasong-17. First revealed in 2020 and successfully launched in 2022, the missile shows clear influences from Soviet design. It weighs around 100 tons and is estimated to have a range of up to 15,000 kilometers.
A heavy multi-axle transporter moves the missile to the launch site and raises it vertically, where targeting and launch procedures are completed. This process is slower than with modern solid-fuel systems, which conduct targeting before elevation. Had multi-axle missile carriers existed in the 1960s, Russia’s earliest mobile missiles might also have been liquid-fuel designs from the Chelomey or Yangel bureaus. But history unfolded differently, leading to the use of lighter solid-fuel missiles on mobile platforms.
These intercontinental missiles are likely already deployed in North Korea. How many are there? This is difficult to assess. Open data on North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is extremely limited, and information on launcher production has only appeared at recent military exhibitions. It is clear, however, that these numbers remain small: just six Hwasong-17 launchers were displayed. It also appears that after developing more advanced solid-fuel systems, Pyongyang scaled back work on the larger Hwasong-17.
Overall, North Korea may now have roughly a dozen deployed mobile ICBMs, both liquid-fuel and solid-fuel. This gives Pyongyang the ability to target not only the Pacific region but also any point in the continental United States.
Missiles with a range of 1,000–5,500 kilometers fall into the medium-range category. While the US and Russia have avoided developing such systems for decades because of the INF Treaty, North Korea and other states faced no such restrictions. As a result, Pyongyang now operates several types of MRBMs.
What sets these missiles apart is their design: many of them carry maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicles. On April 2, 2024, North Korea conducted its first launch of the Hwasong-16B hypersonic missile, which was also displayed at the parade in Pyongyang.
Fired from a transport-launch container mounted on a mobile seven-axle platform, this solid-fuel missile carries a hypersonic gliding warhead capable of riding the edge of the atmosphere and reaching distances of up to 5,000 kilometers. Current missile-defense systems struggle to intercept a maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicle, making the Hwasong-16B capable of striking targets anywhere in Southeast Asia or the Pacific.
A notable development this year is the unveiling of the Hwasong-11Ma system, which carries two missiles with maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicles and has an estimated range of at least 1,000 kilometers. The system has not yet been tested but appeared both at the Pyongyang parade and the National Defense Development 2025 exhibition. Testing is likely to begin soon, followed by deployment. Its five-axle launcher has already been used for several years with conventional Hwasong-11 ballistic missiles, which will be discussed further below.
The new Hwasong-11Ma has a stronger booster and a hypersonic glide vehicle that could, in theory, be deployed in a non-nuclear configuration – if North Korea has resolved the precision-guidance issues that such warheads require. If so, the system would pose a serious threat to the US Navy, as these missiles could strike aircraft carriers far from North Korea’s coastline – assuming such targets can be detected.
Another important system is the Pukguksong-2/KN-15, a mobile missile first tested in 2017. Originally designed for submarine launch, it was later adapted for ground-based mobile launchers. The solid-fuel missile has a range of up to 1,500 kilometers and may be capable of carrying a nuclear payload, although it is unclear whether it is currently deployed. Like other systems, it has been shown during parades and produced in numbers sufficient for testing. And yes, North Korea does possess submarine-launched missiles.
On September 6, 2023, North Korea launched its largest domestically built submarine, the Hero Kim Gun-ok, in Sinpo. The submarine is equipped with four launchers for ballistic missiles and six launch systems for sea-based cruise missiles.
This first North Korean ballistic missile submarine carries Pukguksong-5 missiles, which have a diameter of roughly 1.5 meters. First unveiled in 2021, these are currently the most advanced sea-based missiles in North Korea’s arsenal, with an estimated range of at least 3,000 kilometers.
(L) Submarine the Hero Kim Gun-ok; (R) Pukguksong-5.
Before the latest Pukguksong models appeared, North Korea developed several earlier variants of the missile. Research and testing took place on sea platforms and with a prototype submarine. All of this was part of Kim Jong-Un’s long-running effort to build a viable sea-based missile force – and that goal has now been achieved.
North Korea has successfully deployed a submarine capable of launching intermediate-range ballistic missiles, a capability which had only been achieved by Russia, China, the United States, and India.
North Korea also fields short-range ballistic missiles – systems known in the Soviet army as “frontline missiles” – with ranges between 300 and 1,000 kilometers. Pyongyang has developed several designs within this class.
The KN-25 multiple rocket launcher fires 600 mm rockets. On April 23, 2024, a battery of these rockets was used in North Korea’s first full tactical exercise simulating a nuclear counterstrike. For the first time, it was officially stated that these rockets can carry nuclear warheads. With a range of 400 kilometers, they can reach targets across much of South Korea.
Each KN-25 rocket is equipped with a flight-correction system that significantly improves accuracy. Unlike traditional multiple-launch systems such as the Grad or Katyusha, each missile is individually guided. In one test, the rocket was detonated in mid-air above the target – an approach suited for cluster munitions or nuclear warheads, since an airburst maximizes destructive impact through its shockwave.
Another major system is the Hwasong-11, known in the West as the KN-23 and sometimes jokingly referred to as “Iskander-Pho” because it closely resembles the Russian 9M723 missile from the Iskander-M system.
First unveiled in 2019, the missile now exists in multiple versions, including a mobile ground-launched model and a railway-based variant; tests were also carried out from sea platforms, and it is likely that submarine-launched versions will follow. With a range of up to 600 kilometers, the missile can carry compact nuclear warheads, giving North Korea the ability to strike any target on the Korean Peninsula.
The system’s key strength is its simplicity and standardization: one missile type is used across multiple launch platforms, making it a cost-effective solution. The KN-24, or Hwasong-11B, and its successor, the Hwasong-11D, have shorter ranges of around 400 kilometers. However, each launcher carries two missiles in the Hwasong-11B version and four in the Hwasong-11D version – similar to the US ATACMS system.
North Korean engineers appear not only to have replicated Russia’s Iskander concept but also to have borrowed ideas from ATACMS. The key difference is that while the original ATACMS design is more than three decades old, the North Korean variant uses modern technology, offering roughly one-and-a-half times the range and potentially greater accuracy.
***
In this overview, we have focused solely on ballistic missiles. North Korea has also developed various drones and cruise missiles. But ballistic missiles remain far more difficult for modern air-defense systems to intercept, and North Korea’s arsenal allows it to destroy a potential aggressor without turning to other means of attack. This likely explains Kim Jong-Un’s consistent emphasis on this category of weapons.
