{"id":2832,"date":"2025-09-16T16:00:09","date_gmt":"2025-09-16T16:00:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/globaltalenthq.com\/?p=2832"},"modified":"2025-09-22T18:44:41","modified_gmt":"2025-09-22T18:44:41","slug":"missiles-of-desperation-inside-ukraines-last-ditch-weapons-gamble","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/globaltalenthq.com\/index.php\/2025\/09\/16\/missiles-of-desperation-inside-ukraines-last-ditch-weapons-gamble\/","title":{"rendered":"Missiles of desperation: Inside Ukraine\u2019s last-ditch weapons gamble"},"content":{"rendered":"

From Soviet labs to foreign cash, Kiev is racing to build rockets before Russia shuts the program down for good<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Russia-Ukraine conflict is one of the most intense confrontations of the 21st century – and among the largest military engagements in Europe since World War II. In this environment of full-scale fighting, both sides rely heavily on missile technology to strike deep behind enemy lines, disrupt logistics, and project power.<\/p>\n

Today, Ukraine’s missile arsenal is a patchwork of homegrown designs, leftover Soviet stock, and Western technology. On the tactical level, Soviet-era systems like the Grad are now supplemented by Eastern European clones, but the backbone of long-range strikes comes from American-supplied HIMARS and their derivatives. Modern variants of ATACMS <\/strong>extend Ukraine’s reach to about 300km, along with a handful of European air-launched Storm Shadows – though Kiev’s stock of these appears to be extremely limited. Beyond that range, Ukraine has no Western-made systems to rely on. At greater distances, it must turn to its own projects and the remnants of its Soviet inheritance.<\/p>\n

\n Read more<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n \"RT\"
Rockets from Russia: Inside Moscow\u2019s deadliest arsenal yet<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/blockquote>\n

As we noted in the first part<\/a> of this series, Russia fields a vast and diversified missile arsenal rooted in decades of development. Ukraine’s story is very different. Once home to some of the Soviet Union’s most advanced missile design bureaus, the country has struggled to preserve that expertise and build its own modern systems.<\/p>\n

What does Ukraine’s missile industry actually look like today? And does Kiev have the capacity to produce weapons that can compete on the modern battlefield?<\/p>\n

Grom-2 missiles<\/strong><\/h2>\n

In 2023, the Russian Defense Ministry reported intercepting a Ukrainian Grom-2 missile. This may have been the trial combat use of Kiev’s new ballistic missile system – evidence that at least some prototypes had been assembled and tested under battlefield conditions.<\/p>\n

Before the start of Russia’s military operation in February 2022, Ukraine still had several missile design centers that survived from the Soviet era. Some of these existed only on paper, but others retained technology, personnel, and limited industrial capacity. Among them were the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau and the Luch Design Bureau, both heirs to major Soviet enterprises that had once supplied missiles and space systems for Moscow’s military-industrial complex.<\/p>\n

Yuzhnoye, in particular, was a leader in developing liquid-fueled ICBMs such as the R-36M2 Voevoda (NATO designation: SS-18 “Satan”<\/em>), as well as the solid-fueled Molodets and the Cyclone and Zenit launch vehicles.<\/p>\n

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\n R-36<\/p>\n


\n \u00a9 Wikipedia <\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

After defense cooperation with Russia ended in 2014, these enterprises faced a crisis. Yuzhnoye tried to keep afloat by promoting new tactical and operational missile projects. The most ambitious was the Grom-2, conceived as Ukraine’s answer to Russia’s Iskander system.<\/p>\n

The roots of the Grom-2 reach back to the early 1990s, when Ukrainian engineers took part in the first rounds of work on Iskander variants. In practice, however, development of the Grom-2 relied heavily on foreign money, most notably funding from Saudi Arabia. When that partnership faltered, Kiev put the project on hold – until 2022, when the government suddenly tried to revive it under wartime urgency.<\/p>\n

By 2019, Yuzhnoye had produced two launchers and a small test batch of missiles, with an intended range of up to 500km. On paper, the system looked comparable to Russia’s 9M723 ballistic missile from the Iskander-M. In reality, Russian engineers had spent decades refining their design, while Ukrainian teams struggled to piece together working prototypes. The Grom-2 eventually reached the testing stage, but by late summer 2025, Russian intelligence announced that its production and testing facilities had been destroyed.<\/p>\n

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\n Grom-2<\/p>\n


\n \u00a9 Wikipedia <\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

That said, had it succeeded, the Grom-2 might have become a genuinely modern missile system – one potentially superior to ATACMS and comparable to Russia’s Iskander-M. Such a development could well have rekindled interest among Gulf monarchies and perhaps even further afield. As always, the question was whether Ukraine could move from prototypes to mass production – a step that might have been possible in another time, but not under today’s conditions.<\/p>\n

\n Read more<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n \"RT\"
Missiles don\u2019t lie: What this region\u2019s rocket stockpiles say about the next war<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Long-range Neptune missiles<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Ukraine’s most publicized missile system is the Neptune, built around the R-360 anti-ship missile officially adopted in 2020. In many ways it is a reincarnation of late-Soviet technology: its design is based on the Russian Kh-35, which entered service in 2003. Kiev’s Luch Design Bureau gained access to the Kh-35 in the 1990s, even receiving a benchmark model from Russia’s Zvezda-Strela plant under a bilateral defense agreement. Building on that heritage, Luch became the lead developer of the Neptune complex.<\/p>\n

After the collapse of the Ukrainian Navy in 2014, engineers pushed forward with an anti-ship system modeled on the Kh-35 but with several modifications: longer wings, a solid-fuel booster, and a compact turbojet engine. The R-360 has a range of roughly 280km. It also carries a modern guidance package – combining satellite navigation for mid-course correction with an active radar seeker to lock onto ships or other radar-contrast targets. This makes the missile flexible: it can strike pre-programmed coordinates or autonomously hunt targets detected in flight.<\/p>\n

Neptune missiles saw high-profile combat use early in the war. It was Neptune-type missiles that were credited with striking Russian missile cruiser the Moskva in 2022.<\/p>\n

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\n <\/figure>\n

In 2023, versions of the Neptune adapted for land strikes were reportedly used against S-400 air-defense complexes in Crimea. In 2024, Neptune variants were again reported to have attacked ships of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. These episodes underline how a coastal anti-ship weapon was quickly repurposed for broader operational roles.<\/p>\n

Once the conflict escalated, Ukraine began adapting Neptunes for strikes against land targets. But with only a 280km reach, their effectiveness was limited. Engineers therefore attempted to create an extended-range version with a larger fuel load, reportedly boosting range to between 700 and 1,000km. Technically feasible, such a missile has been developed, though in very small numbers.<\/p>\n

The Neptune is classified as a subsonic cruise missile. Its small size and ability to skim low along terrain make it harder to detect – but not invulnerable. Russia has successfully intercepted similar weapons, including British Storm Shadow missiles. Ukraine’s production capacity is another constraint: at best, only a handful of missiles can be built each month, and each requires launchers and command systems that are difficult to assemble under wartime conditions.<\/p>\n

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\n R-360 Neptune<\/p>\n


\n \u00a9 Wikipedia <\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

By technological standards the Neptune ranks as a contemporary anti-ship missile – and even a versatile subsonic cruise missile that could find buyers on the global arms market. European stealth cruise missiles such as the Storm Shadow are more advanced but also far more expensive. In the current conditions, however, organizing serial production of the Neptune complex is almost impossible, and any talk of exports remains premature.<\/p>\n

Fire Point<\/strong><\/h2>\n

A new name has emerged in Ukraine’s missile industry: Fire Point. At first it looked like a British-Emirati startup, but it has since become clear that the company is essentially a Ukrainian effort established to design and produce drones as well as cruise and ballistic missiles. Its projects have attracted attention in the media – especially the FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile and the FP-1 long-range kamikaze drones, now widely used by Ukrainian forces.<\/p>\n

On August 24, 2025, the port of Ust-Luga in Leningrad Region was struck by FP-1 fixed-wing drones. An Associated Press report published shortly before showed production lines at Ukraine’s Fire Point facility – the footage appeared to capture final assembly of those same drones as well as of the company’s new FP-5 “Flamingo”<\/em> cruise missiles.<\/p>\n

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\n Flamingo missiles are seen at Fire Point’s secret factory in Ukraine on August 18, 2025.<\/p>\n


\n \u00a9  AP Photo \/ Efrem Lukatsky <\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Does Ukraine have the expertise to build cruise missiles? The answer is yes. During the 1980s, the Kharkov Aviation Plant mass-produced long-range strategic cruise missiles – the Kh-55s carried by Tu-95MS and Tu-160 bombers – as well as reconnaissance drones like the Tu-143 Reis. Fire Point’s latest Flamingo missiles appear to draw on this legacy, reportedly using engines from retired L-39 training aircraft.<\/p>\n

Specifications published in open sources claim a range of up to 3,000km, a payload of around 1,000kg, and a cruising speed of roughly 900kph. In theory, those numbers are achievable – though the Flamingo looks more like a budget solution designed for improvised mass production. Unlike piston-engine drones, these are turbojet-powered missiles that fly higher and faster, making them harder to intercept and capable of delivering far more destructive warheads.<\/p>\n

At the same time, Fire Point is moving aggressively into ballistic missile concepts. At the MSPO-2025 arms expo in Poland, the company presented slides of two new designs: the FP-7 and FP-9.<\/p>\n